Introduction
The
issue becomes even more fragmented, when one reviews the literature on the
subject. Ironically, the so called ‘crisis literature’ itself is disjointed,
with some arguing that the crisis is merely an institutional or disciplinary
issue (Stam, 2004), while others urge that the real issue is epistemological
and methodological (Staats, 1983; Kantor, 1979). This paper, however, will follow
Thomas Kuhn (1996) in noting that any science that holds competing
paradigms is only a pre-science until a uniform methodology is adopted and will
therefore focus on the present epistemological fragmentation.
Nor
is this simply a theoretical and philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, the
very reputation of the science of psychology is frequently questioned as
psychological findings are often dismissed as either common sense or in no way
comparable to the strict statistical measures of the hard sciences.[2] This
ongoing fragmentation in the field of Psychology has indeed left not a few leading
psychologists wondering how such a fracture will affect psychology’s validity
as an academic and scholarly pursuit (Gardner, 2005; Rychlak, 2005; Driver-Linn,
2003). On the other
hand, psychology is an inherently practical endeavor insofar as clinicians are working
with individuals, families and children, and policy makers are forming
decisions based on psychological findings and recommendations from authorities
in field.
After
situating the state of the question and reviewing the literature, the second
half of this paper, then, will focus on incorporating the work of the
philosopher Bernard Lonergan in an attempt to fill the lacunae of a
methodological framework that can encompass both the objective and subjective dimensions
of the study of human behavior.
The nature of scientific inquiry
Socrates
was fond of meandering around Athens, asking people, “What is piety?” or “What
is justice?” As would be the case today, most could readily provide examples of
piety or justice, but very few could provide a systematic definition of the
terms. It wasn’t until Aristotle that systematization is offered. With
Aristotle, virtues such as temperance are defined as the mean between the two
extreme of insensibility and intemperance.
The
above Aristotelian anecdote serves also to highlight the systematization
inherent in scientific pursuit and methodology. Surprisingly, it was not too
long ago that scientific methods were based on inductive reasoning. Newton, for
example, first observed the apple fall and only then proceeded to form
hypotheses about the physical phenomenon that he observed. In contrast to this stands Karl Popper’s
(1935) vision of science as hypothetico-deductive
system, where hypotheses come first, followed by careful experimentation, and
discrete falsification.
Falsification,
as the key for Popper, relies on the assumption that inductive evidence is
limited. Since one is unable to observe the physical world at all times, one is
not epistemically justified in creating universally applicable rules based on
one instantiation. Popper provides his famous swan example: for hundreds of
years, Europeans were familiar with the white swan. Using inductive reasoning,
one could then conclude that all swans are white. Yet exploration to the East
revealed black swans in Australia. Induction, then, can never yield certainty
since only one falsifiable observation is needed to refute the (inductively
based) theory.[3]
From
this, six foundational concepts necessary for scientific pursuit can be
discerned. A description of these events, followed by their role within the
science of psychology will be given.
Empirical evidence is the first
component to scientific pursuit. The data collected does not rely on belief or
argumentation; rather it is collected through direct observation or
experimentation. Careful experimentation and documentation is necessary for
data collection and future replication of the study. Next, accurate science
requires objectivity. Personal feelings and values should be eliminated so as
not to compromise objectivity. The data should speak for itself, even if that
implies a different outcome than the investigator initially desired. Third,
control of all extraneous variables is necessary to validly establish cause
(IV) and effect (DV). Prediction of future occurrences of the phenomenon is the
fourth component of a reliable scientific method. Hypothesis testing is the
fifth component. Hypothesis testing requires that the hypothesis be made prior
to the experiment, serves as a prediction, and is derived from theory. Both a
Null and Alternative hypothesis must be operationally defined and unambiguous so that they can be tested
and replicated. Finally, the replication process ensures accuracy and
confidence in creating a scientific body of knowledge. Intense discoveries that
cannot be replicated should not be accepted by other scientists.
[1] Similarly, Vgotsky’s
monumental critique of the fragmented methodologies in the field of psychology
was published in 1928.
[2] While relevant to the
topic of the scientific nature of psychology, a discussion of Null Hypothesis
testing, Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian statistical methods, and the incorporation
of stricter statistical protocols that mimic the natural sciences is beyond the
scope of this present discussion.
[3] Popper was also conscious
of the reciprocal interaction between the individual and her environment. He
therefore rightly rejected the naïve empiricist claims of objective observation of the natural world.
Rather, Popper holds that all observation begins from a specific viewpoint and
is influenced by the knowledge and experience already possessed by human
beings.
by Phillip Kuna, PhD (abd)
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