A further
study provides an integrative account of several previously discussed
constructs. Again using the
misattribution theory as their springboard, Larøi, Linden
and Marczewski (2004) explored the relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs,
cognitive effort and emotional pertinence on a reality monitoring test of
hallucination prone participants. This study is notable for its attempt, not
simply to confirm the already well documented misattribution theory, but rather
to explain the underlying cognitive mechanism of this process. This study is
based primarily on the earlier theoretical work of Morrison, Haddock and
Tarrier (1995), who argue that an affect laden cognitive dissonance occurs when
an unwanted and intrusive thought contradicts a particular meta-cognitive
belief system. This in turn triggers an aversive state of arousal and anxiety.
Either unable or unwilling to existentially face this cognitive dissonance, the
individual attributes the intrusive thought to an external source (i.e., the
event becomes hallucinatory). One example of a meta-cognitive framework ripe for
this phenomenon may be, “Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of
weakness” (Larøi, 2007). Finally, the researchers note cautiously that even if
such cognitive stars do indeed align they should be seen within the larger
context of predisposing factors to hallucinations.
The researchers tested this
hypothesis by first screening 100 undergraduates on the Launay-Slade
Hallucinations Scale (LSHS). Those scoring in the upper 25th
percentile were considered hallucination prone (HP; N = 25) and those on the
lower 25th percentile were considered non-hallucination prone (NHP;
N = 25). There was no significant distribution difference between genders. A French
translation of the Meta-Cognitive Questionnaire (MCQ) was administered to
assess participant’s meta-cognitive beliefs systems. Based on a 4-point Likert
scale, the 64 question MCQ purports to assesses internal positive and negative
beliefs regarding intrusive thoughts and meta-cognitive monitoring based on the
following five sub-scales: 1) Positive beliefs about worry (PB), 2) Negative
beliefs about the uncontrollability of
thoughts and corresponding danger (UD), 3) Cognitive confidence (CC),
4) Negative beliefs about
thoughts in general (specifically thoughts related to
superstition, punishment and responsibility; SPR), and 5) Cognitive self-consciousness (CSC).
Participants were then given a
reality monitoring test. Similar to other such procedures, the participants
were orally presented with 30 words (10 positive, 10 negative, and 10 neutral),
and were asked to speak the first word that came to mind. The affect laden
words were chosen based in part on the previous work of Braun, Marczewski and
Van der Linden (2000). Examples include “bankrupt, suicide, cancer” for
negative words, and “paradise, seduce and succeed” as positive words. Neutral
words included, “pencil, domain, sheet.” Subjects could provide any verbal
response except a proper noun. After a 20 minute delay, participants were shown
a computer screen with the original word list, their verbal responses, and
distractor words and asked to identify whether the words were from the previous
list or not. If the word was from the previous list, participants were
instructed to indicate the source—whether participant response or experimenter.
As predicted, the results indicated
a significant difference between the HP group and the NHP group in terms of
source discrimination errors, particularly when the material was self-generated
(U = 43, p < .05). Again, a significant difference was found between the HP
group and the NHP group on MCQ scores. Specifically, the researchers found
positive correlations between LSHS scores and all five MCQ sub-scales. Also, interestingly,
positive correlations between scores on the UD sub-scale (negative beliefs
about uncontrollable thoughts; Spearman r = .49, p < .05), the CC sub-scale
(cognitive confidence; Spearman r = .45, p < .05) and source discrimination
errors were found. Results were interpreted to support the misattribution
theory, as well providing further support for the previously mentioned continuum
model of hallucinations.
While commendable for the testing of
multiple constructs relating to hallucinations in normal populations and thus
validating previous research, this study’s largest deficit is its inability to
explain the cognitive processes involved. As I have argued, this is related to
the lack of a systematic account of cognitional operations with which to
validate. The implications of this critique are described more fully in the
following conclusion.
Finally, a
brief but pertinent study considers the source of hallucinations in individuals
with remitted schizophrenia from an information-processing deficit perspective.
Miller and Saccuzzo (1979) employed a backward-masking paradigm to assess the
initial stages of information-processing in individuals with schizophrenia in
remission. In general, visual masking happens when one visual stimulus obstructs
discernibility of another visual stimulus. Backward masking, then, is the
experimental procedure whereby the target stimulus is presented first, before
the masking stimulus (Skottun
and Skoyles, 2009). Although somewhat dated, the Miller and Saccuzzo
(1979) study is an important contribution to the study of hallucinations in
schizophrenic individuals. Additional research has suggested that individuals
with schizophrenia have a particular deficiency in the magno-cellular level of
the visual system (Green, Nuechterlein, & Mintz, 1994), and abnormal
backward visual masking is interpreted as evidence of this claim (Butler &
Javitt, 2005).
Participants
included a mere 10 individuals in the normal control group, and an equally
sparse 10 individuals with schizophrenia. The schizophrenic individuals, all on
anti-psychotic medication, were residents at a care facility with over one year
of hospitalization, and three months symptom-free prior to testing. Before
testing, participant’s vision was assessed by means of the Snellen Eyey Chart, and
language comprehension was measured by the Wechsler Vocabulary subscale.
In terms of the procedure of
backward masking, the researchers employed both a blank masking condition as
well a pattern mask by means of a tachistoscope. Each
masking condition was affixed to the tachistoscope so that the stimulus was
located centrally in the field of vision. The pattern mask was two capital
“W’s” adjacent to each other as well as a small, back-lit cross just above the
Ws. As Miller and Saccuzzo report, “The fixation field remained constantly
illuminated (1.0 ftL or 3.43 cd/m2) providing a lighted background between
trials. Luminance in both the stimulus and masking fields was set at 16.33 ftL
(55.95 cd/m2) throughout the experiment” (Miller and Saccuzzo, 1979, p. 447).
Participants were to detect either a “T” or an “A” from a two-alternative
forced choice task. Finally, each masking task was administered under five
stages: a no mask control, and subsequent 10, 75, 150, and 250 millisecond
delay of the mask to the stimulus presentation.
Results indicated that the
normal control group made significantly more correct decisions on both masking
conditions (p < .01). Similarly, the normal control group scored
significantly higher than schizophrenic individuals on both the 2 millisecond
delay (p < .01) and the 4 millisecond (p < .05) delay trials. Clearly, individuals
with schizophrenia, even though they were non-symptomatic for three months, had
more difficulty with detection in the presence of the masking stimulus. These
results were interpreted to implicate the possible role pre-cortical processing
deficiency. Miller and Saccuzzo argue that, while their conclusions are still
tentative, this may be a possible means of measurement of clinical symptomology
as well.
Conclusion
In addition to the over-arching
epistemological problem, several specific directions for future research have
already been noted throughout this paper: the inclusion of emotionally charged
stimuli in experimentation, further investigation into the mediating factors of
hallucinations—particularly trauma—as well further examination of the role of
cognitive effort and meta-cognitive beliefs.
Although
the hypothesis that misattributed vivid mental images were the origins of VH
was proposed by Galton over than 100 years ago (Galton, 1883), a review of the
literature reveals that attempts to verify and replicate this claim have been
either contradictory or have failed to specify the cognitive mechanism of
action. I have argued that the cause for this lack of scientific progress is
due to a combination of a fundamental disagreement as well a definite absence
of explicit theory of knowledge guiding such cognitive research.
In the above discussion of the
Aleman et al. article, I noted a possible underlying position of positivism.
Positivism has arguably been the prevailing philosophical paradigm since
inception of modern psychology (Breen and Darlaston-Jones, 2010), since it
provides support for psychology as a justified scientific endeavor that is
observable, replicable and objective. Recent research into the nature of human
consciousness further exemplifies the still current prevalence of positivism.
Chalmers (1996), for instance, argues that while attempts to explain the
invisible are all well and good, what is physical is ultimately real.
Ironically, even researchers in the hard sciences that psychology strives to
emulate—say, physics for instance—understand that the particles they
investigate are often times simply constructs of human intelligence. Such
constructs, while not ultimately tangible, are ways to explain what must indeed
be so if they are to offer an explanation of what has actually been observed.
In other words, as the history of psychology has shown, despite its limited and
initial benefits, the narrowness of positivism is not rich enough to account
for the complexities of the human condition, and the future of the science of
psychology may be contingent upon the integration of both the objective and
subjective components inherent in human cognition.
Although again constrained by the
scope of this paper, future research would do well in looking to the seminal
work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan for a unifying epistemological
foundation. Lonergan, by grounding objectivity within one’s own subjectivity
and rational self-consciousness, provides a plausible, reliable and indeed
first person empirical alternative to the varied epistemological and
methodological approaches currently present in psychological theory (Brannick,
2006). With a unified
epistemological framework in place, future research would be able to advance by
constructing more specialized experiments consistent with such integrated
theory of knowledge.
In conclusion, this was a cursory
treatment of a vast and growing body of literature, and should not be
considered a comprehensive review. A complete analysis would entail more
detailed comparisons between the theoretical and epistemological underpinnings,
especially in instances of conflicting results. Based on this preliminary
research, however, I hypothesize that crux of the inconsistencies in the
literature are based on a pervasive positivism that mistakenly equates
knowledge to ocular vision. That is, as was seen in the Aleman et al. article,
the assumption is that internal data are subjective, private events that cannot
be understood since they cannot be observed. The difficulty with this position,
however, is that if knowing is simply a
matter of taking a good look, then knowing knowing (i.e., meta-cognition) would
be nothing more than looking at looking (cf. Lonergan, 1967a). As such, future
research would do well to investigate, explicate and unify these often subtle
epistemological claims underpinning psychological theory and research.
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By Phillip J. Kuna, PhD (abd)
for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling
www.drjohngkuna.com
By Phillip J. Kuna, PhD (abd)
for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling
www.drjohngkuna.com
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