Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Is Psychology a Science? (Part II)



A brief review of some of psychology’s prevailing theories will be offered here in order to highlight the fundamental difficulty psychology has had in adopting the objective component of scientific methods to the often subjective field of human behavior.
            Psychoanalysis has had some initial success in explaining and understanding human behavior. Kline (1989), for instance, argues that Freudian psychoanalytic theory can be systematized into testable hypotheses that are empirically verifiable. Yet critics of this model, Karl Popper being one of them (Grünbaum, 1979), cite its failure to be a significant lack in prediction of behavior, and instead merely explaining behavior inductively and post facto. Kline’s post facto restructuring of psychoanalytic theories is a prime example of this. In a now somewhat infamous study, Scrodel (1957) hypothesized that orally dependent men would in fact prefer women with larger breasts, yet his research revealed the opposite conclusion, and there was no correlation between orally dependent men and their breast size preference. Kline explains away Scrodel’s findings by arguing that the orality hypothesis must be correct, and the subjects were merely experiencing reaction formation.
            Similarly, Behaviorism attempted to structure it’s methodology as scientific as possible. The hallmark of behaviorist theories was not only the fact that only a few theories were needed to explain a variety of behavior from language acquisition to moral development, but more importantly, they also provided verifiable results. They were able to both control and predict human (and non-human) behavior, while remaining faithful to the scientific principles outlined above. Yet, despite their best efforts, behaviorists were ultimately unable to account for both the plethora of variables that interact and affect human behavior as well as their underlying assumptions about the deterministic nature of the environment at the neglect of personal agency.
            Finally, cognitive psychology has made impressive progress in its attempt to understand unobservable mental processes by formulating models and conducting experiments upon behavior to confirm or refute them.
            On the other end of the spectrum, theorists such as Carl Rogers (1962) and Abraham Maslow are representational of the humanistic approach to psychology. Such an approach places a higher value on the individual’s subjective experience than on empirical testing in a scientific laboratory environment. Again, the humanistic approach is less interested in controlling and predicting behavior, and is more concerned with an empathic, “client-centered” approach. Within this heuristic, the therapist, attempting to put aside her own values and schemas, views the client not as an object to be diagnosed and treated, but instead sees the client’s behavior as subject. The scientific pursuit of psychology is rejected by the humanistic approach on the grounds that it dehumanizes people, and ultimately, is unable to capture fullness of human experience.
            While some of the above examples exhibit instances of meeting some of the scientific criteria outlined above, no one theory is yet to offer full control and predictability of human behavior. The following section, therefore, will examine the humanistic approaches to psychology, in order to highlight the way in which psychology has historically grappled with the objective—subjective dissonance.

                        The objective-subjective divide in psychological methodology

            Psychology is not alone in their attempt to bridge the objective—subjective rift. Indeed, even the so called hard sciences like physics grapple with this issue. Heisenberg (1958) put it this way:
Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of analyzing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation (p. 29).
            This issue becomes more pronounced in the field of psychology, where therapists are urged to be objective and scientific. Attempting to climb to a level of objectivity, very often the therapist ends up objectifying their client. That is, the client ceases to be an individual with distinct needs and conations, but rather becomes data to be collected for diagnosis. Further, the subjective, inner experience of the client is seen in contradistinction to the cool, detached and objective position of the therapist. It is supposed that with pure objectivity, the therapist has a fuller understanding of the subject’s affects and cognitions—and indeed, it is assumed that the objective therapist has a more fuller understanding of the client’s affects and cognitions than the client himself!

            As was highlighted above, the field of psychology is no stranger to this dichotomy. The differing theoretical thrusts of the behaviorists compared to the humanistic approach indicate quite accurately this opposition. Smith (1997), for example, provides an excellent portrayal of the long history of these opposing anthropologies. Similarly, Polkinghorne (1982) has noted how such anthropological and methodological differences have tended to center on the question of whether the human sciences should emulate the methods of the natural sciences, or should they rather develop their own unique methodology. Philosophers like Husserl (1977) would argue that human beings are quite distinct from any other type of object found in the physical world, and therefore require a unique methodology for accurate study. In that vein, our next entry will turn to Bernard Lonergan’s Transcendental Method (TM) in an attempt to bridge this objective—subjective lacunae in psychological methodology.

by Phillip J. Kuna 
for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling

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