The Central Nervous System: Correlates of Dreams and Waking Hallucinations

In a previous entry, I explored the connection between the visual system and visual hallucinations reported by individuals with schizophrenia. Since dreams can be understood as the nervous system’s processing of endogenous information, I was interested to understand and explore the correlation between dreams and hallucinations as they are processed by the nervous system.

            Research revealed a fruitful article by Mahowald, Woods, and Schenck titled, “Sleeping Dreams, Waking Hallucinations, and the Central Nervous System.” The authors note that the study concerns the critical evaluation of “the similarities and differences between dreams and hallucinations, with particular reference to the role of the central nervous system in each and with consideration of their patho-physiologic implications.” More of a review of the literature  than an empirical study, the article had 6 major headings: 1) dream mechanisms, 2) hallucination mechanisms, 3) dreaming and hallucinations: state disassociation models, 4) hallucinations (spontaneous and induced) in the non-psychiatric population, 5) dreams and hallucinations as a manifestation of consciousness, 6) hallucinations in neurological disorders.  For the astute reader, a copious and valuable four pages of references follows the article.

            The first section was standard enough. Their presentation of hallucinatory mechanisms stressed a view of endogenous brain activity being released when the individual is dissociated from stimuli: for instance, West’s theory argues that we are always in a dream state; we just are not attending to it because we are constantly stimulated—we can’t see the stars during the day, though they are still there.

            Section 4, while interesting, wasn’t my main interest in the article, as it presented topics such: fasting and sleep deprivation induced hallucinations (especially in religious/mystics), and drug induced hallucinations. Skipping ahead, the final section (6) provided more substance to several related areas, including: hallucinations in Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, phantom limb syndrome, and Charles Bonnet Syndrome.

            Finally, the fifth section (dreams and hallucinations as a manifestation of consciousness) had interesting correlates to schizophrenic hallucinations. We know that the brain is active during both REM and non REM sleep. Further, we can define consciousness as the brains awareness of all available data presented to it. While awake, this information is our environment, external stimuli. While asleep, however, this stimulus is internally generated. Further, we know from neuroimaging that during REM sleep there is a decrease in PVC (primary visual cortex) and Frontal Association activity. From this information, the researchers hypothesize that “the extrastriate cortices and paralimbic areas may be operating as a closed system, functionally disconnected from the primary visual and the frontal regions responsible for the integration of visual information.”

            Further evidence for this hypothesis that consciousness is maintained by the brain’s spatial and temporal mapping that integrates multiple brain areas can be seen in the fact that both during REM and the wake state there is a 40 Hz oscillatory rhythm throughout the cortex. Such a rhythmic oscillation may provide a continuous “neuronal humming” whereby internal or external irregularities would be conspicuous. What is most interesting is that this rhythm is reset during the wake state by sensory stimuli…but it is not reset during REM sleep.

            The theory, then, is that some deviation of either the spatial or temporal regularity of this rhythm may be at the root of some hallucinations—specifically those experienced by individuals with schizophrenia. Much of the literature uncovered, however, focused squarely on the differences between dreams and hallucinations. The convergence of these themes proved fertile, and we can most certainly anticipate further research involving this intersection. More so as our neurobiological techniques and understanding increases. For instance, it was only 40 years ago that the REM phasic event intrusion hypothesis was offered as an explanation for waking hallucinations in schizophrenia, but this theory was never verified because the prevailing assumption at the time was that dreaming was confined to REM sleep only!

References

Mahowald, M. W., Woods, S. R., & Schenck, C. H. (1998). Sleeping dreams, waking

hallucinations, and the central nervous system. Dreaming, 8(2), 89-102.

doi:10.1023/B:DREM.0000005899.59224.17

by +Phillip J. Kuna

for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates

drjohngkuna.com

Is Psychology a Science? (Part IV, Conclusion)

Bernard Lonergan

Method, then, is defined as “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). Here, cumulative results entail a sustained succession of discoveries and progress results indicate synthesis of each new insight that builds upon previously validated insights. Yet transcendental method is more than a mere prescription, a set of rules to follow. Increasing a set of regulations associated with a methodology does not necessarily increase cumulative and progressive results. What is needed, Lonergan argues, is a “prior, normative pattern of operations from which rules may be derived” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 6). Lonergan’s cognitional structure and intentionality analysis provide such an a priori structure with which to inform a methodology.

            The implications for such a methodology are nothing short of staggering. If correct, Lonergan’s transcendental method provides the basis for integrating first person data with third person data into a unified theory. As Lonergan explains,

Transcendental method offers a key to unified science…in harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind, which operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each (Lonergan, 1972, p. 24).   

The process of heightening one’s conscious intentionality, directing one’s awareness to one’s own conscious and cognitional operations is what Lonergan terms self-appropriation. Indeed, the first four chapters of Lonergan’s Insight are nothing short of exercises in self-appropriation. Guiding the reader though a series of thought experiments, the beginning of Insight is meant to allow the reader to reach that eureka moment, and to form an awareness of what happens within themselves during such cognitional procedures. Such self-appropriation is the basis for transcendental method, and is indeed the only way in which to assure accurate first person data as well as a secure methodological foundation:

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human…subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodological control…as well as an a priori whence he can understand other men [women], their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

            Further, self-appropriation necessarily implies the employment of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts that correspond to the above cognitional operations: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. Providing an experiential, first person data for these cognitional structures not only enables the duplication and reiteration of these structures, but again, also provides an invariant and structured methodology:

Despite the doubts and denials of positivists and behaviorists, no one, unless some of his [or her] organs are deficient is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing…of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all of his lifelong he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his own activities (Lonergan, 1972, p. 16-17).

            Finally, Lonergan’s method is trans-cultural. He argues that the rational self-consciousness that can be derived from intentionality analysis is not only normative but also innate to each individual regardless of their cultural milieu. That is, these cognitional features are present in each person, and are the stabilizing feature throughout even, say, a differentiation from a classicist perspective to an empirical one (Lonergan, 1967). The classicist views culture as perennial, absolute, whereas the empiricist is able to adapt to the changing tide of human living, while nonetheless retaining truth (Lonergan, 1972, p. 333). Such a cross cultural methodology would surely be of great interest to many psychologists.

Implications

            One may contend that all this philosophy is well and good, but how would one proceed to utilize transcendental method in concrete or therapeutic situations. Brannick (2006) offers a unique voice to the contribution. His unpublished Master’s thesis wove together strands of Lonergan’s thought with emergent probability theory. He concluded by presenting the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) as a possible psychometric instrument with which to empirically validate Lonergan’s claim to unification of the objective and subjective dimensions of human conscious operations. Theoretically, Brannick’s argument is sound. Yet, as he notes in his conclusion, the restructuring of the RIM needed to adapt it to Lonergan’s scheme has yet to be undertaken. I heartily second Brannick’s recommendation for further work on this front.

            Further applications of transcendental method are nearly limitless. For instance, one could see how social psychologists would be particularly interested in such a methodology. Answers to questions as how does one conduct a social survey on current topics such as race relations, abortion, or the legal status of gay marriage without being influenced by one’s personal values are neatly answered in Lonergan’s system. Clearly, value-free systems are illusory—either by those conducting the survey or by those surveyed. And while the study of values may properly belong to ethicists, one cannot realistically divorce value-laden systems from human behavior. In that vein, a more appropriate, more Lonerganian approach would be an explicit recognition and divulgence of one’s values. Such values would indicate one’s approach to the survey, and would also dictate why certain questions are raised and not others. Through self-appropriation, values become explicit, enabling a secure and unambiguous foundation for experimentation.

Conclusion

            Having situated the topic within the framework of both the historical and emerging paradigms of psychology, we preceded to provide an over-view of the general nature of scientific inquiry. Such an explication was necessary, not only to again situate the discussion of psychology within the other sciences, but more importantly to provide a heuristic basis to the way in which I argued that psychology should view and subsequently proceed as a scientific discipline. The subsequent discussion on the nature and extent of objective-subjective divide within psychology provided concrete instances, which I later implied how Lonergan’s transcendental method would be applicable to such instances. Finally, Lonergan’s transcendental method based both from his cognitional theory and his theory of conscious intentionality was presented as a viable alternative to the pluralistic epistemological accounts now operating in mainstream psychology.

            Alarcon (1997) has argued that a unifying paradigm for psychology should be based on 1) philosophical anthropology, 2) the domains within which psychology ought to operate and 3) methodological avenues.  Indeed, by grounding objectivity within one’s own subjectivity and rational self-consciousness, Lonergan’s method provides a plausible, reliable and indeed first person empirical alternative to the varied methodological approaches to the study of psychology. As Meynell (1994) has noted,

According to one extreme view of the matter, a true science of humanity would reduce the explanation of human behavior to natural scientific laws. At the other extreme, it is protested that one needs for the human sciences a kind of ‘divinization’, ‘empathy’ or whatever, which is wholly distinct from any procedure to be employed by the natural scientist. Lonergan’s position on the matter at once mediates between these two extremes, and is perfectly consistent within itself. What is particular to the human sciences, in his view, is that the object as well as the subject of inquiry is to be assumed to be more or less intelligent, reasonable and so on, and its behavior to be explained accordingly…in the natural as in the human sciences, one has intelligently and creatively to hypothesize; but in the human as in the natural sciences, one has reasonably to judge one’s hypotheses to be probably true or false according to their corroboration or falsification by relevant observable data (p. 121-122).

            I offer one final anecdote in conclusion. Max Planck, the scientist responsible for the revolutionary and fundamental discoveries regarding quantum theory, put forth this question in his autobiography: how is it that a new scientific paradigm becomes accepted within the larger community? Is it the lucidity of the observations? Perhaps it is the exactness of measurements? Or yet still, it may be decisiveness of the experimental results? No, in fact none of these are the cause. The real reason for the advancement of a new scientific revolution, Plank says, is when the present generation of professors is retired (Planck, 1949, p. 33-34). In other words, in the context of paradigmatic shifts, both the social and the hard sciences share the common ground of a rethinking of the basic axioms and postulates inherent to their study—a transformation of the object of their study. In the social sciences, however, and particularly within psychology, the human person is the object of study. What I urge is needed, then, is nothing short of the radical transformation of the human person—who is at once both the subject and object of scientific investigation. Lonergan’s self-appropriation of interiority provides an empirically, self-verified methodology that bridges the subjective—objective dichotomy.  As Lonergan puts it, “authentic objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

By Phillip J. Kuna

For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates

Drjohngkuna.com

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Is Psychology a Science? (Part III)

Bridging the gap: Lonergan’s Theory of Conscious Intentionality

  

Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) is perhaps best known for his philosophical and theological 

contributions. By his own admission, his academic career was carried out "under impossible conditions," within a system that was "hopelessly antiquated" (Lonergan, 1973, p. 15). It was a system that, in neglecting the need for specialization in modernity, relied too heavily on the outdated concept of the homo universale while simultaneously operating within both an insufficient philosophy and a classicist notion of culture (Lonergan, 1974, pp. 209-210)

            The archaic and perennial philosophy to which Lonergan revolted was the metaphysical system developed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who in turn relied heavily on Aristotle. It was a metaphysical system based on the archaic notion of a faculty psychology. Faculty psychology suggests that the mind consists of different powers, or faculties: the intellect, the will, and the emotions—all the while presupposing a Cartesian mind-body dualism. Indeed, faculty psychology’s grip was so strong that it remained the prevailing learning theory until the early 20^th century when Edward Thorndike, the student of William James, published groundbreaking studies on learning in animals and humans (Thorndike, 1932). Clearly, such a faculty psychology would not be sufficient to address the emerging concerns of the 20^th century.

            Lonergan’s project, then, was an attempt to take into account the Enlightenment’s turn to the subject while at the same time constructing a methodology that would avoid the Kantian epidemic of collapsing in on itself. Thus, Lonergan asserts that while metaphysics may still be first in itself, it is no longer the foundation that it once was. Rather, he takes cognitional operations and intentionality analysis, as his starting point (intentionality analysis refers here to the philosophy of Lonergan’s Transcendental Method, of which his cognitional theory forms the basis).  It has as its basis the following pre-suppositions: 1) humans have an unrestricted, unlimited, detached and disinterested desire to know (as is evidenced in the constant questioning, that any parent of a toddler is familiar with), 2) a normative and fixed pattern of recurring mental and cognitional operations involved in the process of inquiry and investigation, and 3) immanent norms of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility that guide the cognitive dimension of human consciousness (Lonergan, 1992).

            What Lonergan provides then, is a cognitional theory that informs a theory of consciousness, which in turn informs a metaphysics and an ethics. The decisiveness of Lonergan’s theory can be seen in sharp distinction to the many conflicting and often overwhelming theories of consciousness currently in vogue. Even a brief survey of the psychological literature on consciousness studies reveals multifaceted methodologies often based on inaccurate or incomplete foundations. Searle (1997), for instance, appeals to perceptual models to describe the imperceptibleness of consciousness. Others (Dennett, 1991; Griffin, 1991; Hay, 2007) maintain that mental images and representations are necessary to explain the invisibleness of consciousness. Finally, still others (Chalmers, 1996) argue that while attempts to explain the invisible are all well and good, but what is physical is ultimately real. The irony of course is that even those in the hard sciences—say, particle physics for instance—understand that the particles they are discussing are often times simply constructs of human intelligence. Such constructs, while not ultimately tangible, are ways to explain what must indeed be so if they are to offer an explanation of what has actually been observed. In other words, the future of the science of psychology may be contingent upon the integration of both the objective and subjective components inherent in human cognition.

            While Lonergan’s method has received great attention in the fields of philosophy, theology, ethics (Melchin, 1987), feminist studies (Crysdale, 1994) and even economics (McShane, 1996), there is a notable lack of application of his method in the field of psychology. Proceeding now to summarize Lonergan’s account of the unfolding of human consciousness, the explication and defense of each unique and distinct philosophical position will be clearly untenable. I refer the curious to his original works.   

Non-reflexive Consciousness

            Lonergan distinguishes between what he terms reflexive consciousness and non-reflexive consciousness. Generally, consciousness is defined here as an “interior experience, of oneself and one’s acts, where experience is taken in the strict sense of the word” (Lonergan, 2002, p. 157). It is the strict sense insofar as it differs from an undefined knowledge. It is experiential insofar as it is a direct awareness of data, which initiates a process of intellectual inquiry to understand what has been experienced and to pronounce judgment on its reality.

            Non-Reflexive consciousness, then, is conscious awareness of awareness. Such a cognitional act does not imply an object. Rather, it is an experiential awareness of one’s own subjectivity. Again, such awareness is not found by naval-gazing introspection. Introspection would only reveal the subject as object. To discern the subject as subject one has merely to increase one’s level of activity. “If one sleeps and dreams, one becomes present to oneself as the frightened dreamer. If one wakes, one becomes present to oneself, not as moved but as moving.” (Lonergan, 1967, p. 227)

            Inasmuch as it is an experience of one’s acts, Lonergan argues that while one performs their daily tasks of living they are aware, not only of the sensations and data of experience, but also aware of the acts themselves. For example, right now as I hear my dog bark, I can recognize not only the sounds, but I am also able to attend to the fact that I am hearing. Again, I can decide that my dog needs to be taken outside. In this instance, I am aware not only of the decision to take him out, but also of my own cognitional state of deciding and finally of myself as deciding (Lonergan, 1967, pp. 175-176).                

            A further clarification rests on Lonergan’s distinction between consciousness and reflexive knowledge. Consciousness is not to be confused with reflexive knowledge. Consciousness, in Lonergan’s terms, comes prior to reflexive self-knowledge, and as such, is the subject’s experience of oneself as subject. Reflexive self-knowledge, on the other hand, completes the direct awareness of consciousness by forming and verifying concepts through the subject’s self-experience (Lonergan, 1967, pp. 177-178).        

            A comparative analysis should yield further clarification. Lonergan demarcates his own line of thought from the many prevailing opinions that consider consciousness to be some sort of introspection, or positions that describes or implies that conscious awareness involves some sort of inward looking.[1] Termed Conscientia-perceptio[2] by Lonergan, this view supposes that consciousness is the same process as direct knowing. Yet such analogies fail here, for in non-reflexive consciousness, there is no subject-object relationship governing the cognitive processes. Rather, it is simply objectless awareness, with no objectified aspect of self. That is to say, my knowledge of my dog is not equivalent to the way in which I am aware of myself. In both cases there is knowledge of an object. Notable is that in the second case that subject knows oneself as an object. The problem with conscientia-perceptio, Lonergan argues, is that a cognitive act does not constitute any effect in its object. That is, if consciousness is direct self-knowledge, then it would have no constitutive effect on the self, thereby reducing the subject’s psychological unity to beyond the object in one’s range of knowledge. This distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive consciousness is crucial for Lonergan, for it is “the difference between conscious and unconscious acts” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 322). That is, it is from the subjective and conscious awareness (non-reflecting consciousness) from which the objectification of cognitional acts of reflecting consciousness emerge. The following section describes Lonergan’s account of reflexive consciousness—the intentional acts of human consciousness that enable us to grasp the inherent intelligibility of both internal and external stimuli.

Reflexive Consciousness and Intentionality Analysis

            For Lonergan, the objectification of subjective stimuli, both external and internal, occurs as one’s reflexive consciousness unfolds through four distinct levels. Levels here should be understood metaphorically. Spatial and temporal analogies of human conscious tend to fail since they imply an ocular component to consciousness. Further, unlike the direct awareness of self-provided by non-reflexive consciousness, reflexive consciousness always intends an object (Lonergan, 1967).

            The acts of reflexive consciousness that intends both internal and external objects, Lonergan argues, are governed by four distinct levels of intentionality. The four levels of intentionality—conscious awareness (attention), intelligent understanding (intelligence), reasonable judgment (reasonableness), and responsible decision (responsibility)—are proposed to be the normative and recurrent pattern of human cognition. That is, in conjunction with the ongoing and non-objectified self-awareness of non-reflexive consciousness, cognitive operations experienced in the form of questioning, provide an orientation toward objectification of an attended to stimuli—again, whether external or internal.

            The first level of conscious intentionality, attending to the stimulus at hand, implies more than mere looking. In Lonergan’s system, conscious awareness and attention imply the “detached, disinterested desire to know” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 10). It implies a thrust of wonder, of curiosity, of marvel. Such is the wonder Aristotle spoke of, citing it as the beginning of all philosophy and scientific knowledge. Such is the wonder of the young child, who with innocent and unwavering curiosity interrogates his parents with questions ad infinitum.[3]

            Lonergan describes the second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent understanding, in this way: “an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, and work out the presuppositions and implications of our position” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 9). The understanding and insights produced by intelligently probing the data received through conscious awareness opens up then further questions that can only be answered by advancement to the third level of reasonable judgment.

            Reasonable judgment answers to the question, “Is it so? Is it not so? Is it?” In Lonerganian terms: the insights, hypotheses, and theories propounded in the second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent understanding, are put to the strict demands of rational judgment. As Lonergan (1992) explains, the third level contains

The effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason is where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and the refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to a grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent (p. 346).

Here, the unconditioned simply means that all pertinent questions have been answered. If a person comes home after a long day at work, see smoke in the air and water on the floor, can he assume there was a fire? Have all pertinent questions been answered? According to Lonergan, he has not yet answered all pertinent questions, and therefore cannot be said to have grasped the virtually unconditioned. All one say in the above scenario is that there is smoke in the air and water on the floor, and something has happened.

            Finally, Lonergan’s fourth level of conscious intentionality, responsible decision, entails the raising and answering of questions that imply a reasonable and responsible course of action. Similar to personal agency, such an concept of responsible decision implies that human beings can freely choose a course of action that is either consistent or inconsistent to what has been determined to be reasonable understanding (second level) of the attended (first level) to data (Lonergan, 1972).        

            Attempts to deny Lonergan’s cognitional structure and theory of conscious intentionality would imply that the commentator has not attended to the data, is unintelligent, unreasonable, or sound asleep. That is, any attempts to refute Lonergan’s claims would necessarily involve the operations outlined above, namely—attending to the data presented, grasping the intelligibility of the theory, and making a reasonable judgment of its veracity (Lonergan, 1972, p. 17).

Up to this point, we have outlined in broad strokes the basis for Lonergan’s methodology.

Thus far, we have looked to the success of the natural sciences to gather a preliminary understanding of methodology. We have taken a detour behind the techniques of the natural sciences to the fundamentals of the cognitional operations of the human mind. From those basic processes of the human mind, a transcendental method[4] can be discerned—basic patterns and operations that are employed, cross culturally, in every cognitional enterprise. From there, the formulation of such a transcendental method can be accurately applied to special methodologies appropriate for particular fields of study (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). As Lonergan (1972) notes,

However true it is that one attends, understands, judges, decides differently in the natural sciences, in the human sciences, as in theology, still the difference in no way imply or suggest a transition from attention to inattention, from intelligence to stupidity, from reasonableness to silliness, from responsibility to irresponsibility (p. 23).

Part IV of this post will conclude by outlining an application of Lonergan’s  method to the science of psychology.

By Phillip Kuna

For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling

Drjohngkuna.com 

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[1] A select few of psychology’s prevailing theories of consciousness that employ such perceptual models were covered earlier, if but briefly.

[2] Lonergan, 2002, p. 181. The phrase can be loosely translated from the Latin as “perceptive consciousness”.

[3] For more on this orientation of wonder, and its subsequent decline with age, see Lonergan (2012), chapters 6 and 7.

[4] The method is transcendental because it goes beyond (transcends) itself by the raising of further questions. 

Is Psychology a Science? (Part II)

A brief review of some of psychology’s prevailing theories will be offered here in order to highlight the fundamental difficulty psychology has had in adopting the objective component of scientific methods to the often subjective field of human behavior.

            Psychoanalysis has had some initial success in explaining and understanding human behavior. Kline (1989), for instance, argues that Freudian psychoanalytic theory can be systematized into testable hypotheses that are empirically verifiable. Yet critics of this model, Karl Popper being one of them (Grünbaum, 1979), cite its failure to be a significant lack in prediction of behavior, and instead merely explaining behavior inductively and post facto. Kline’s post facto restructuring of psychoanalytic theories is a prime example of this. In a now somewhat infamous study, Scrodel (1957) hypothesized that orally dependent men would in fact prefer women with larger breasts, yet his research revealed the opposite conclusion, and there was no correlation between orally dependent men and their breast size preference. Kline explains away Scrodel’s findings by arguing that the orality hypothesis must be correct, and the subjects were merely experiencing reaction formation.

            Similarly, Behaviorism attempted to structure it’s methodology as scientific as possible. The hallmark of behaviorist theories was not only the fact that only a few theories were needed to explain a variety of behavior from language acquisition to moral development, but more importantly, they also provided verifiable results. They were able to both control and predict human (and non-human) behavior, while remaining faithful to the scientific principles outlined above. Yet, despite their best efforts, behaviorists were ultimately unable to account for both the plethora of variables that interact and affect human behavior as well as their underlying assumptions about the deterministic nature of the environment at the neglect of personal agency.

            Finally, cognitive psychology has made impressive progress in its attempt to understand unobservable mental processes by formulating models and conducting experiments upon behavior to confirm or refute them.

            On the other end of the spectrum, theorists such as Carl Rogers (1962) and Abraham Maslow are representational of the humanistic approach to psychology. Such an approach places a higher value on the individual’s subjective experience than on empirical testing in a scientific laboratory environment. Again, the humanistic approach is less interested in controlling and predicting behavior, and is more concerned with an empathic, “client-centered” approach. Within this heuristic, the therapist, attempting to put aside her own values and schemas, views the client not as an object to be diagnosed and treated, but instead sees the client’s behavior as subject. The scientific pursuit of psychology is rejected by the humanistic approach on the grounds that it dehumanizes people, and ultimately, is unable to capture fullness of human experience.

            While some of the above examples exhibit instances of meeting some of the scientific criteria outlined above, no one theory is yet to offer full control and predictability of human behavior. The following section, therefore, will examine the humanistic approaches to psychology, in order to highlight the way in which psychology has historically grappled with the objective—subjective dissonance.

                        The objective-subjective divide in psychological methodology

            Psychology is not alone in their attempt to bridge the objective—subjective rift. Indeed, even the so called hard sciences like physics grapple with this issue. Heisenberg (1958) put it this way:

Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of analyzing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation (p. 29).

            This issue becomes more pronounced in the field of psychology, where therapists are urged to be objective and scientific. Attempting to climb to a level of objectivity, very often the therapist ends up objectifying their client. That is, the client ceases to be an individual with distinct needs and conations, but rather becomes data to be collected for diagnosis. Further, the subjective, inner experience of the client is seen in contradistinction to the cool, detached and objective position of the therapist. It is supposed that with pure objectivity, the therapist has a fuller understanding of the subject’s affects and cognitions—and indeed, it is assumed that the objective therapist has a more fuller understanding of the client’s affects and cognitions than the client himself!

            As was highlighted above, the field of psychology is no stranger to this dichotomy. The differing theoretical thrusts of the behaviorists compared to the humanistic approach indicate quite accurately this opposition. Smith (1997), for example, provides an excellent portrayal of the long history of these opposing anthropologies. Similarly, Polkinghorne (1982) has noted how such anthropological and methodological differences have tended to center on the question of whether the human sciences should emulate the methods of the natural sciences, or should they rather develop their own unique methodology. Philosophers like Husserl (1977) would argue that human beings are quite distinct from any other type of object found in the physical world, and therefore require a unique methodology for accurate study. In that vein, our next entry will turn to Bernard Lonergan’s Transcendental Method (TM) in an attempt to bridge this objective—subjective lacunae in psychological methodology.

by Phillip J. Kuna 

for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling

drjohngkuna.com