 |
| Bernard Lonergan |
Method, then, is defined as “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). Here, cumulative results entail a sustained succession of discoveries and progress results indicate synthesis of each new insight that builds upon previously validated insights. Yet transcendental method is more than a mere prescription, a set of rules to follow. Increasing a set of regulations associated with a methodology does not necessarily increase cumulative and progressive results. What is needed, Lonergan argues, is a “prior, normative pattern of operations from which rules may be derived” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 6). Lonergan’s cognitional structure and intentionality analysis provide such an a priori structure with which to inform a methodology.
The implications for such a methodology are nothing short of staggering. If correct, Lonergan’s transcendental method provides the basis for integrating first person data with third person data into a unified theory. As Lonergan explains,
Transcendental method offers a key to unified science…in harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind, which operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each (Lonergan, 1972, p. 24).
The process of heightening one’s conscious intentionality, directing one’s awareness to one’s own conscious and cognitional operations is what Lonergan terms self-appropriation. Indeed, the first four chapters of Lonergan’s Insight are nothing short of exercises in self-appropriation. Guiding the reader though a series of thought experiments, the beginning of Insight is meant to allow the reader to reach that eureka moment, and to form an awareness of what happens within themselves during such cognitional procedures. Such self-appropriation is the basis for transcendental method, and is indeed the only way in which to assure accurate first person data as well as a secure methodological foundation:
The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human…subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodological control…as well as an a priori whence he can understand other men [women], their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).
Further, self-appropriation necessarily implies the employment of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts that correspond to the above cognitional operations: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. Providing an experiential, first person data for these cognitional structures not only enables the duplication and reiteration of these structures, but again, also provides an invariant and structured methodology:
Despite the doubts and denials of positivists and behaviorists, no one, unless some of his [or her] organs are deficient is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing…of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all of his lifelong he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his own activities (Lonergan, 1972, p. 16-17).
Finally, Lonergan’s method is trans-cultural. He argues that the rational self-consciousness that can be derived from intentionality analysis is not only normative but also innate to each individual regardless of their cultural milieu. That is, these cognitional features are present in each person, and are the stabilizing feature throughout even, say, a differentiation from a classicist perspective to an empirical one (Lonergan, 1967). The classicist views culture as perennial, absolute, whereas the empiricist is able to adapt to the changing tide of human living, while nonetheless retaining truth (Lonergan, 1972, p. 333). Such a cross cultural methodology would surely be of great interest to many psychologists.
Implications
One may contend that all this philosophy is well and good, but how would one proceed to utilize transcendental method in concrete or therapeutic situations. Brannick (2006) offers a unique voice to the contribution. His unpublished Master’s thesis wove together strands of Lonergan’s thought with emergent probability theory. He concluded by presenting the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) as a possible psychometric instrument with which to empirically validate Lonergan’s claim to unification of the objective and subjective dimensions of human conscious operations. Theoretically, Brannick’s argument is sound. Yet, as he notes in his conclusion, the restructuring of the RIM needed to adapt it to Lonergan’s scheme has yet to be undertaken. I heartily second Brannick’s recommendation for further work on this front.
Further applications of transcendental method are nearly limitless. For instance, one could see how social psychologists would be particularly interested in such a methodology. Answers to questions as how does one conduct a social survey on current topics such as race relations, abortion, or the legal status of gay marriage without being influenced by one’s personal values are neatly answered in Lonergan’s system. Clearly, value-free systems are illusory—either by those conducting the survey or by those surveyed. And while the study of values may properly belong to ethicists, one cannot realistically divorce value-laden systems from human behavior. In that vein, a more appropriate, more Lonerganian approach would be an explicit recognition and divulgence of one’s values. Such values would indicate one’s approach to the survey, and would also dictate why certain questions are raised and not others. Through self-appropriation, values become explicit, enabling a secure and unambiguous foundation for experimentation.
Conclusion
Having situated the topic within the framework of both the historical and emerging paradigms of psychology, we preceded to provide an over-view of the general nature of scientific inquiry. Such an explication was necessary, not only to again situate the discussion of psychology within the other sciences, but more importantly to provide a heuristic basis to the way in which I argued that psychology should view and subsequently proceed as a scientific discipline. The subsequent discussion on the nature and extent of objective-subjective divide within psychology provided concrete instances, which I later implied how Lonergan’s transcendental method would be applicable to such instances. Finally, Lonergan’s transcendental method based both from his cognitional theory and his theory of conscious intentionality was presented as a viable alternative to the pluralistic epistemological accounts now operating in mainstream psychology.
Alarcon (1997) has argued that a unifying paradigm for psychology should be based on 1) philosophical anthropology, 2) the domains within which psychology ought to operate and 3) methodological avenues. Indeed, by grounding objectivity within one’s own subjectivity and rational self-consciousness, Lonergan’s method provides a plausible, reliable and indeed first person empirical alternative to the varied methodological approaches to the study of psychology. As Meynell (1994) has noted,
According to one extreme view of the matter, a true science of humanity would reduce the explanation of human behavior to natural scientific laws. At the other extreme, it is protested that one needs for the human sciences a kind of ‘divinization’, ‘empathy’ or whatever, which is wholly distinct from any procedure to be employed by the natural scientist. Lonergan’s position on the matter at once mediates between these two extremes, and is perfectly consistent within itself. What is particular to the human sciences, in his view, is that the object as well as the subject of inquiry is to be assumed to be more or less intelligent, reasonable and so on, and its behavior to be explained accordingly…in the natural as in the human sciences, one has intelligently and creatively to hypothesize; but in the human as in the natural sciences, one has reasonably to judge one’s hypotheses to be probably true or false according to their corroboration or falsification by relevant observable data (p. 121-122).
I offer one final anecdote in conclusion. Max Planck, the scientist responsible for the revolutionary and fundamental discoveries regarding quantum theory, put forth this question in his autobiography: how is it that a new scientific paradigm becomes accepted within the larger community? Is it the lucidity of the observations? Perhaps it is the exactness of measurements? Or yet still, it may be decisiveness of the experimental results? No, in fact none of these are the cause. The real reason for the advancement of a new scientific revolution, Plank says, is when the present generation of professors is retired (Planck, 1949, p. 33-34). In other words, in the context of paradigmatic shifts, both the social and the hard sciences share the common ground of a rethinking of the basic axioms and postulates inherent to their study—a transformation of the object of their study. In the social sciences, however, and particularly within psychology, the human person is the object of study. What I urge is needed, then, is nothing short of the radical transformation of the human person—who is at once both the subject and object of scientific investigation. Lonergan’s self-appropriation of interiority provides an empirically, self-verified methodology that bridges the subjective—objective dichotomy. As Lonergan puts it, “authentic objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).
By Phillip J. Kuna
For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates
References
Alarcón R. (1997). La síntesis experimental del comportamiento y la unificación de la psicología. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 29 (3), 415-433
Beveridge, A. Time to abandon the subjective—objective divide? The Psychiatrist (2002)
26: 101-103 doi: 10.1192/pb.26.3.101
Bühler, K. (1927). Die Krise der Psychologie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.
Brannick, K. J. (2006). Norms of the Mind: Applying Lonergan’s Analysis of Human consciousness to the epistemological crisis in psychological theory and clinical
practice (Master’s thesis). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
database (Accession No.: 2006-99002-250).
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p< .05). American Psychologist, 49(12), 997-1003. Doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.12.997
Crysdale, C. ed. (1994). Lonergan and Feminism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
De Feijoo. (2011). La crisis de la subjetividad: Despuntar de las psicologías
fenomenológicas. Psicologia em Estudo, 16(3), 409-417.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & Co.
Driver-Linn, E. ( 2003). Where is psychology going? Structural fault lines revealed by psychologists' use of Kuhn. American Psychologist, 58, 269– 278.
Doran, R. (1977). Subject and psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the search for foundations. Washington, DC: University Press of America.
Gardner, H. ( 2005). Scientific psychology: Should we bury it or praise it? In R. J.Sternberg (Ed.) , Unity in psychology: Possibility or pipedream? (pp. 77– 90).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Goertzen, J. R. (2008). On the possibility of unification: The reality and nature of
the crisis in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 18(6), 829-852. doi:10.1177/0959354308097260
Griffin, D. R. (1991). What is consciousness and why is it so problematic? In K. R. Kao
(Ed.), Cultivating consciousness: Enhancing human potential, wellness, and healing (pp. 51–70). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Grünbaum, A. (1979). Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory pseudo-scientific by Karl
Popper's criterion of demarcation? Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25(4), 574-589. doi:10.1037/a0013540
Grünbaum, A. (2012). Epistemological liabilities of the psychoanalytic method of free association, In M. Holowchak (Ed.), Radical claims in Freudian psychoanalysis: Point/Counterpoint (pp. 167-172). Lanham, MD US: Jason Aronson.
Hay, D. (2007). Something there: The biology of the human spirit. Philadelphia, PA:
Templeton Foundation Press.
Helminiak, D. A. (2013). More Than Awareness: Bernard Lonergan's Multi-Faceted
Account of Consciousness. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.
Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0031682
Heisenberg, W. (1958). The Physicist's Conception of Nature. London: Hutchinson.
Horstein, Gale. The Return of the Repressed. Psychology’s Problematic Relations with Psychoanalysis 1909-1960.
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague:
Martinus Nihjoff Publishers.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Evolution and revolution in the philosophy of science. Revista
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague:
Martinus Nihjoff Publishers.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Evolution and revolution in the philosophy of science. Revista
Mexicana de Análisis de la Conducta, 3(1), 7-16.
Kantor, J. R. (1979). Psychology: Science or nonscience? The Psychological Record,
29(2), 155-163.
Kline, P. (1989). Objective tests of Freud's theories. In A. M. Colman, J. Beaumont
(Eds.), Psychology survey, 7 (pp. 127-145). Oxford Florence, England: British Psychological Society.
Koch, S. (1971). Reflections on the state of psychology. Social Research, 38, 669–709.
Koch, S. (1981). The nature and limits of psychological knowledge: Lessons of a century
qua“science.” American Psychologist, 36, 257–269.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Lacey, H. (1999). Is science value free? Values and scientific understanding. London,
UK: Routledge.
Lonergan, B. J. F. (1967). “Cognitional Structure” in F. E. Crowe (Ed.). Collection:
Papers by Bernard Lonergan (221-239). New York, NY: Herder and Herder.
Lonergan, B. J. F. (1972). Method in theology. New York, NY: Herder and Herder.
Lonergan. B. J. F. (1973). Philosophy of God and Theology: The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the functional Specialty, Systematics. London: Darton
Longman and Todd.
Lonergan, B. J. F. (1974). “An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, SJ.” In A Second Collection. Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press.
Lonergan, B. J. F. (1992). Insight: A study of human understanding. Collected works of
Bernard Lonergan (Vol. 3). Toronto, Canada: Toronto University Press. (Original
work published 1957)
Lonergan, B. J. F. (2002). The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ,
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Vol. 7). (Michael Shields, Trans).
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Original work published in 1956)
McShane, P. (1996). Economics for Everyone. Edmonton: Commonwealth Press.
Melchin, K. (1987). History, Ethics and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and
History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America.
Meynell, H. (1994). Lonergan's Cognitional Theory and Method in Psychology. Theory Psychology, 4: 105 DOI: 10.1177/0959354394041005
Planck, M. (1949). Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. F. Gaynor. New
York: Philosophical Library.
Polkinghorne, D. (1982). What makes research humanistic? Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 22(3), 47-54. doi: 10.1177/0022167882223007
Popper, K. (1935). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York, NY: Science Editions,
Inc.
Rogers, C. (1961). On Becoming a Person. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Rogers, C. (1965). Client Centered Therapy. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Rychlak, J. F. ( 2005). Unification in theory and method: Possibilities and
impossibilities. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Unity in psychology: Possibility or pipedream? (pp. 145– 158). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Searle, J. R. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York, NY: The New York Review
of Books.
Staats, A.W. (1983). Psychology’s crisis of disunity: Philosophy and method for a unified science. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Staats, A. W. (1999). Unifying psychology requires new infrastructure, theory, method,
and a research agenda. Review of General Psychology, 3(1), 3-13. 10.1037/1089-2680.3.1.3
Staats, A. W. (1998). Unifying psychology: A scientific or non-scientific theory task?
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 18(1), 70-79. 10.1037/h0091317
Stam, H. J. (2004). Unifying Psychology: Epistemological Act or Disciplinary
Maneuver? Journal Of Clinical Psychology, 60(12), 1259-1262. doi:10.1002/jclp.20069
Tharp, R. G. (2007). A perspective on unifying culture and psychology: Some
philosophical and scientific issues. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 27-28(2-1), 213-233. doi: 10.1037/h0091294
Thorndike, E. (1932), The Fundamentals of Learning. New York, NY: Bureau of
Publications, Teacher’s College, Columbia University.
Yanchar, S.C. (1997). Fragmentation in focus: History, integration, and the project of
evaluation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 17, 150-171.
Zavershneva, E. (2012). Investigating L.S. Vygotsky’s Manuscript “The Historical
Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology.” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 50(4), 42-63. doi: 10.2753/RPO1061-0405500402
No comments:
Post a Comment