Is Psychology a Science? (Part IV, Conclusion)

Bernard Lonergan

Method, then, is defined as “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). Here, cumulative results entail a sustained succession of discoveries and progress results indicate synthesis of each new insight that builds upon previously validated insights. Yet transcendental method is more than a mere prescription, a set of rules to follow. Increasing a set of regulations associated with a methodology does not necessarily increase cumulative and progressive results. What is needed, Lonergan argues, is a “prior, normative pattern of operations from which rules may be derived” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 6). Lonergan’s cognitional structure and intentionality analysis provide such an a priori structure with which to inform a methodology.

            The implications for such a methodology are nothing short of staggering. If correct, Lonergan’s transcendental method provides the basis for integrating first person data with third person data into a unified theory. As Lonergan explains,

Transcendental method offers a key to unified science…in harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind, which operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each (Lonergan, 1972, p. 24).   

The process of heightening one’s conscious intentionality, directing one’s awareness to one’s own conscious and cognitional operations is what Lonergan terms self-appropriation. Indeed, the first four chapters of Lonergan’s Insight are nothing short of exercises in self-appropriation. Guiding the reader though a series of thought experiments, the beginning of Insight is meant to allow the reader to reach that eureka moment, and to form an awareness of what happens within themselves during such cognitional procedures. Such self-appropriation is the basis for transcendental method, and is indeed the only way in which to assure accurate first person data as well as a secure methodological foundation:

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human…subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodological control…as well as an a priori whence he can understand other men [women], their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

            Further, self-appropriation necessarily implies the employment of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts that correspond to the above cognitional operations: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. Providing an experiential, first person data for these cognitional structures not only enables the duplication and reiteration of these structures, but again, also provides an invariant and structured methodology:

Despite the doubts and denials of positivists and behaviorists, no one, unless some of his [or her] organs are deficient is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing…of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all of his lifelong he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his own activities (Lonergan, 1972, p. 16-17).

            Finally, Lonergan’s method is trans-cultural. He argues that the rational self-consciousness that can be derived from intentionality analysis is not only normative but also innate to each individual regardless of their cultural milieu. That is, these cognitional features are present in each person, and are the stabilizing feature throughout even, say, a differentiation from a classicist perspective to an empirical one (Lonergan, 1967). The classicist views culture as perennial, absolute, whereas the empiricist is able to adapt to the changing tide of human living, while nonetheless retaining truth (Lonergan, 1972, p. 333). Such a cross cultural methodology would surely be of great interest to many psychologists.

Implications

            One may contend that all this philosophy is well and good, but how would one proceed to utilize transcendental method in concrete or therapeutic situations. Brannick (2006) offers a unique voice to the contribution. His unpublished Master’s thesis wove together strands of Lonergan’s thought with emergent probability theory. He concluded by presenting the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) as a possible psychometric instrument with which to empirically validate Lonergan’s claim to unification of the objective and subjective dimensions of human conscious operations. Theoretically, Brannick’s argument is sound. Yet, as he notes in his conclusion, the restructuring of the RIM needed to adapt it to Lonergan’s scheme has yet to be undertaken. I heartily second Brannick’s recommendation for further work on this front.

            Further applications of transcendental method are nearly limitless. For instance, one could see how social psychologists would be particularly interested in such a methodology. Answers to questions as how does one conduct a social survey on current topics such as race relations, abortion, or the legal status of gay marriage without being influenced by one’s personal values are neatly answered in Lonergan’s system. Clearly, value-free systems are illusory—either by those conducting the survey or by those surveyed. And while the study of values may properly belong to ethicists, one cannot realistically divorce value-laden systems from human behavior. In that vein, a more appropriate, more Lonerganian approach would be an explicit recognition and divulgence of one’s values. Such values would indicate one’s approach to the survey, and would also dictate why certain questions are raised and not others. Through self-appropriation, values become explicit, enabling a secure and unambiguous foundation for experimentation.

Conclusion

            Having situated the topic within the framework of both the historical and emerging paradigms of psychology, we preceded to provide an over-view of the general nature of scientific inquiry. Such an explication was necessary, not only to again situate the discussion of psychology within the other sciences, but more importantly to provide a heuristic basis to the way in which I argued that psychology should view and subsequently proceed as a scientific discipline. The subsequent discussion on the nature and extent of objective-subjective divide within psychology provided concrete instances, which I later implied how Lonergan’s transcendental method would be applicable to such instances. Finally, Lonergan’s transcendental method based both from his cognitional theory and his theory of conscious intentionality was presented as a viable alternative to the pluralistic epistemological accounts now operating in mainstream psychology.

            Alarcon (1997) has argued that a unifying paradigm for psychology should be based on 1) philosophical anthropology, 2) the domains within which psychology ought to operate and 3) methodological avenues.  Indeed, by grounding objectivity within one’s own subjectivity and rational self-consciousness, Lonergan’s method provides a plausible, reliable and indeed first person empirical alternative to the varied methodological approaches to the study of psychology. As Meynell (1994) has noted,

According to one extreme view of the matter, a true science of humanity would reduce the explanation of human behavior to natural scientific laws. At the other extreme, it is protested that one needs for the human sciences a kind of ‘divinization’, ‘empathy’ or whatever, which is wholly distinct from any procedure to be employed by the natural scientist. Lonergan’s position on the matter at once mediates between these two extremes, and is perfectly consistent within itself. What is particular to the human sciences, in his view, is that the object as well as the subject of inquiry is to be assumed to be more or less intelligent, reasonable and so on, and its behavior to be explained accordingly…in the natural as in the human sciences, one has intelligently and creatively to hypothesize; but in the human as in the natural sciences, one has reasonably to judge one’s hypotheses to be probably true or false according to their corroboration or falsification by relevant observable data (p. 121-122).

            I offer one final anecdote in conclusion. Max Planck, the scientist responsible for the revolutionary and fundamental discoveries regarding quantum theory, put forth this question in his autobiography: how is it that a new scientific paradigm becomes accepted within the larger community? Is it the lucidity of the observations? Perhaps it is the exactness of measurements? Or yet still, it may be decisiveness of the experimental results? No, in fact none of these are the cause. The real reason for the advancement of a new scientific revolution, Plank says, is when the present generation of professors is retired (Planck, 1949, p. 33-34). In other words, in the context of paradigmatic shifts, both the social and the hard sciences share the common ground of a rethinking of the basic axioms and postulates inherent to their study—a transformation of the object of their study. In the social sciences, however, and particularly within psychology, the human person is the object of study. What I urge is needed, then, is nothing short of the radical transformation of the human person—who is at once both the subject and object of scientific investigation. Lonergan’s self-appropriation of interiority provides an empirically, self-verified methodology that bridges the subjective—objective dichotomy.  As Lonergan puts it, “authentic objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

By Phillip J. Kuna

For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates

Drjohngkuna.com

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Is Psychology a Science? (Part III)

Bridging the gap: Lonergan’s Theory of Conscious Intentionality

  

Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) is perhaps best known for his philosophical and theological 

contributions. By his own admission, his academic career was carried out "under impossible conditions," within a system that was "hopelessly antiquated" (Lonergan, 1973, p. 15). It was a system that, in neglecting the need for specialization in modernity, relied too heavily on the outdated concept of the homo universale while simultaneously operating within both an insufficient philosophy and a classicist notion of culture (Lonergan, 1974, pp. 209-210)

            The archaic and perennial philosophy to which Lonergan revolted was the metaphysical system developed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who in turn relied heavily on Aristotle. It was a metaphysical system based on the archaic notion of a faculty psychology. Faculty psychology suggests that the mind consists of different powers, or faculties: the intellect, the will, and the emotions—all the while presupposing a Cartesian mind-body dualism. Indeed, faculty psychology’s grip was so strong that it remained the prevailing learning theory until the early 20^th century when Edward Thorndike, the student of William James, published groundbreaking studies on learning in animals and humans (Thorndike, 1932). Clearly, such a faculty psychology would not be sufficient to address the emerging concerns of the 20^th century.

            Lonergan’s project, then, was an attempt to take into account the Enlightenment’s turn to the subject while at the same time constructing a methodology that would avoid the Kantian epidemic of collapsing in on itself. Thus, Lonergan asserts that while metaphysics may still be first in itself, it is no longer the foundation that it once was. Rather, he takes cognitional operations and intentionality analysis, as his starting point (intentionality analysis refers here to the philosophy of Lonergan’s Transcendental Method, of which his cognitional theory forms the basis).  It has as its basis the following pre-suppositions: 1) humans have an unrestricted, unlimited, detached and disinterested desire to know (as is evidenced in the constant questioning, that any parent of a toddler is familiar with), 2) a normative and fixed pattern of recurring mental and cognitional operations involved in the process of inquiry and investigation, and 3) immanent norms of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility that guide the cognitive dimension of human consciousness (Lonergan, 1992).

            What Lonergan provides then, is a cognitional theory that informs a theory of consciousness, which in turn informs a metaphysics and an ethics. The decisiveness of Lonergan’s theory can be seen in sharp distinction to the many conflicting and often overwhelming theories of consciousness currently in vogue. Even a brief survey of the psychological literature on consciousness studies reveals multifaceted methodologies often based on inaccurate or incomplete foundations. Searle (1997), for instance, appeals to perceptual models to describe the imperceptibleness of consciousness. Others (Dennett, 1991; Griffin, 1991; Hay, 2007) maintain that mental images and representations are necessary to explain the invisibleness of consciousness. Finally, still others (Chalmers, 1996) argue that while attempts to explain the invisible are all well and good, but what is physical is ultimately real. The irony of course is that even those in the hard sciences—say, particle physics for instance—understand that the particles they are discussing are often times simply constructs of human intelligence. Such constructs, while not ultimately tangible, are ways to explain what must indeed be so if they are to offer an explanation of what has actually been observed. In other words, the future of the science of psychology may be contingent upon the integration of both the objective and subjective components inherent in human cognition.

            While Lonergan’s method has received great attention in the fields of philosophy, theology, ethics (Melchin, 1987), feminist studies (Crysdale, 1994) and even economics (McShane, 1996), there is a notable lack of application of his method in the field of psychology. Proceeding now to summarize Lonergan’s account of the unfolding of human consciousness, the explication and defense of each unique and distinct philosophical position will be clearly untenable. I refer the curious to his original works.   

Non-reflexive Consciousness

            Lonergan distinguishes between what he terms reflexive consciousness and non-reflexive consciousness. Generally, consciousness is defined here as an “interior experience, of oneself and one’s acts, where experience is taken in the strict sense of the word” (Lonergan, 2002, p. 157). It is the strict sense insofar as it differs from an undefined knowledge. It is experiential insofar as it is a direct awareness of data, which initiates a process of intellectual inquiry to understand what has been experienced and to pronounce judgment on its reality.

            Non-Reflexive consciousness, then, is conscious awareness of awareness. Such a cognitional act does not imply an object. Rather, it is an experiential awareness of one’s own subjectivity. Again, such awareness is not found by naval-gazing introspection. Introspection would only reveal the subject as object. To discern the subject as subject one has merely to increase one’s level of activity. “If one sleeps and dreams, one becomes present to oneself as the frightened dreamer. If one wakes, one becomes present to oneself, not as moved but as moving.” (Lonergan, 1967, p. 227)

            Inasmuch as it is an experience of one’s acts, Lonergan argues that while one performs their daily tasks of living they are aware, not only of the sensations and data of experience, but also aware of the acts themselves. For example, right now as I hear my dog bark, I can recognize not only the sounds, but I am also able to attend to the fact that I am hearing. Again, I can decide that my dog needs to be taken outside. In this instance, I am aware not only of the decision to take him out, but also of my own cognitional state of deciding and finally of myself as deciding (Lonergan, 1967, pp. 175-176).                

            A further clarification rests on Lonergan’s distinction between consciousness and reflexive knowledge. Consciousness is not to be confused with reflexive knowledge. Consciousness, in Lonergan’s terms, comes prior to reflexive self-knowledge, and as such, is the subject’s experience of oneself as subject. Reflexive self-knowledge, on the other hand, completes the direct awareness of consciousness by forming and verifying concepts through the subject’s self-experience (Lonergan, 1967, pp. 177-178).        

            A comparative analysis should yield further clarification. Lonergan demarcates his own line of thought from the many prevailing opinions that consider consciousness to be some sort of introspection, or positions that describes or implies that conscious awareness involves some sort of inward looking.[1] Termed Conscientia-perceptio[2] by Lonergan, this view supposes that consciousness is the same process as direct knowing. Yet such analogies fail here, for in non-reflexive consciousness, there is no subject-object relationship governing the cognitive processes. Rather, it is simply objectless awareness, with no objectified aspect of self. That is to say, my knowledge of my dog is not equivalent to the way in which I am aware of myself. In both cases there is knowledge of an object. Notable is that in the second case that subject knows oneself as an object. The problem with conscientia-perceptio, Lonergan argues, is that a cognitive act does not constitute any effect in its object. That is, if consciousness is direct self-knowledge, then it would have no constitutive effect on the self, thereby reducing the subject’s psychological unity to beyond the object in one’s range of knowledge. This distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive consciousness is crucial for Lonergan, for it is “the difference between conscious and unconscious acts” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 322). That is, it is from the subjective and conscious awareness (non-reflecting consciousness) from which the objectification of cognitional acts of reflecting consciousness emerge. The following section describes Lonergan’s account of reflexive consciousness—the intentional acts of human consciousness that enable us to grasp the inherent intelligibility of both internal and external stimuli.

Reflexive Consciousness and Intentionality Analysis

            For Lonergan, the objectification of subjective stimuli, both external and internal, occurs as one’s reflexive consciousness unfolds through four distinct levels. Levels here should be understood metaphorically. Spatial and temporal analogies of human conscious tend to fail since they imply an ocular component to consciousness. Further, unlike the direct awareness of self-provided by non-reflexive consciousness, reflexive consciousness always intends an object (Lonergan, 1967).

            The acts of reflexive consciousness that intends both internal and external objects, Lonergan argues, are governed by four distinct levels of intentionality. The four levels of intentionality—conscious awareness (attention), intelligent understanding (intelligence), reasonable judgment (reasonableness), and responsible decision (responsibility)—are proposed to be the normative and recurrent pattern of human cognition. That is, in conjunction with the ongoing and non-objectified self-awareness of non-reflexive consciousness, cognitive operations experienced in the form of questioning, provide an orientation toward objectification of an attended to stimuli—again, whether external or internal.

            The first level of conscious intentionality, attending to the stimulus at hand, implies more than mere looking. In Lonergan’s system, conscious awareness and attention imply the “detached, disinterested desire to know” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 10). It implies a thrust of wonder, of curiosity, of marvel. Such is the wonder Aristotle spoke of, citing it as the beginning of all philosophy and scientific knowledge. Such is the wonder of the young child, who with innocent and unwavering curiosity interrogates his parents with questions ad infinitum.[3]

            Lonergan describes the second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent understanding, in this way: “an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, and work out the presuppositions and implications of our position” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 9). The understanding and insights produced by intelligently probing the data received through conscious awareness opens up then further questions that can only be answered by advancement to the third level of reasonable judgment.

            Reasonable judgment answers to the question, “Is it so? Is it not so? Is it?” In Lonerganian terms: the insights, hypotheses, and theories propounded in the second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent understanding, are put to the strict demands of rational judgment. As Lonergan (1992) explains, the third level contains

The effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason is where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and the refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to a grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent (p. 346).

Here, the unconditioned simply means that all pertinent questions have been answered. If a person comes home after a long day at work, see smoke in the air and water on the floor, can he assume there was a fire? Have all pertinent questions been answered? According to Lonergan, he has not yet answered all pertinent questions, and therefore cannot be said to have grasped the virtually unconditioned. All one say in the above scenario is that there is smoke in the air and water on the floor, and something has happened.

            Finally, Lonergan’s fourth level of conscious intentionality, responsible decision, entails the raising and answering of questions that imply a reasonable and responsible course of action. Similar to personal agency, such an concept of responsible decision implies that human beings can freely choose a course of action that is either consistent or inconsistent to what has been determined to be reasonable understanding (second level) of the attended (first level) to data (Lonergan, 1972).        

            Attempts to deny Lonergan’s cognitional structure and theory of conscious intentionality would imply that the commentator has not attended to the data, is unintelligent, unreasonable, or sound asleep. That is, any attempts to refute Lonergan’s claims would necessarily involve the operations outlined above, namely—attending to the data presented, grasping the intelligibility of the theory, and making a reasonable judgment of its veracity (Lonergan, 1972, p. 17).

Up to this point, we have outlined in broad strokes the basis for Lonergan’s methodology.

Thus far, we have looked to the success of the natural sciences to gather a preliminary understanding of methodology. We have taken a detour behind the techniques of the natural sciences to the fundamentals of the cognitional operations of the human mind. From those basic processes of the human mind, a transcendental method[4] can be discerned—basic patterns and operations that are employed, cross culturally, in every cognitional enterprise. From there, the formulation of such a transcendental method can be accurately applied to special methodologies appropriate for particular fields of study (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). As Lonergan (1972) notes,

However true it is that one attends, understands, judges, decides differently in the natural sciences, in the human sciences, as in theology, still the difference in no way imply or suggest a transition from attention to inattention, from intelligence to stupidity, from reasonableness to silliness, from responsibility to irresponsibility (p. 23).

Part IV of this post will conclude by outlining an application of Lonergan’s  method to the science of psychology.

By Phillip Kuna

For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling

Drjohngkuna.com 

---

[1] A select few of psychology’s prevailing theories of consciousness that employ such perceptual models were covered earlier, if but briefly.

[2] Lonergan, 2002, p. 181. The phrase can be loosely translated from the Latin as “perceptive consciousness”.

[3] For more on this orientation of wonder, and its subsequent decline with age, see Lonergan (2012), chapters 6 and 7.

[4] The method is transcendental because it goes beyond (transcends) itself by the raising of further questions. 

Is Psychology a Science? (Part 1)

Introduction

           

 This entry will identify and integrate both the objective and subjective dimensions of human conscious experience into a unified theory. The first part of this paper will focus on situating the often referenced, but rarely resolved problem of psychology qua science. That is, since psychology’s inception it has been concerned with objectivity, with working within the structure of scientific methods, with discerning laws of human behavior that are reliable, predictable, accurate—and hopefully cross cultural and universal. Psychology has been defined variously throughout its progression, whether it be the study of human behavior, human nature, or even the ever ambiguous designation of the study of the “mind”. Yet, the method of quantifying the objective component in the midst of so much subjectivity has produced a plethora or methodologies, schools, systems and theories. Nor is this a relatively modern problematic. Despite claims that the methodological fragmentation in psychology is a recent occurrence (Goertzen, 2012), it was indeed as early as 1929, that Karl Bühler published his famous Die Krise der Psychologie.[1]

            The issue becomes even more fragmented, when one reviews the literature on the subject. Ironically, the so called ‘crisis literature’ itself is disjointed, with some arguing that the crisis is merely an institutional or disciplinary issue (Stam, 2004), while others urge that the real issue is epistemological and methodological (Staats, 1983; Kantor, 1979). This paper, however, will follow Thomas Kuhn (1996) in noting that any science that holds competing paradigms is only a pre-science until a uniform methodology is adopted and will therefore focus on the present epistemological fragmentation.

            Nor is this simply a theoretical and philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, the very reputation of the science of psychology is frequently questioned as psychological findings are often dismissed as either common sense or in no way comparable to the strict statistical measures of the hard sciences.[2] This ongoing fragmentation in the field of Psychology has indeed left not a few leading psychologists wondering how such a fracture will affect psychology’s validity as an academic and scholarly pursuit (Gardner, 2005; Rychlak, 2005; Driver-Linn, 2003). On the other hand, psychology is an inherently practical endeavor insofar as clinicians are working with individuals, families and children, and policy makers are forming decisions based on psychological findings and recommendations from authorities in field.

            After situating the state of the question and reviewing the literature, the second half of this paper, then, will focus on incorporating the work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan in an attempt to fill the lacunae of a methodological framework that can encompass both the objective and subjective dimensions of the study of human behavior.

The nature of scientific inquiry

            Socrates was fond of meandering around Athens, asking people, “What is piety?” or “What is justice?” As would be the case today, most could readily provide examples of piety or justice, but very few could provide a systematic definition of the terms. It wasn’t until Aristotle that systematization is offered. With Aristotle, virtues such as temperance are defined as the mean between the two extreme of insensibility and intemperance.

            The above Aristotelian anecdote serves also to highlight the systematization inherent in scientific pursuit and methodology. Surprisingly, it was not too long ago that scientific methods were based on inductive reasoning. Newton, for example, first observed the apple fall and only then proceeded to form hypotheses about the physical phenomenon that he observed.  In contrast to this stands Karl Popper’s (1935) vision of science as hypothetico-deductive system, where hypotheses come first, followed by careful experimentation, and discrete falsification.

            Falsification, as the key for Popper, relies on the assumption that inductive evidence is limited. Since one is unable to observe the physical world at all times, one is not epistemically justified in creating universally applicable rules based on one instantiation. Popper provides his famous swan example: for hundreds of years, Europeans were familiar with the white swan. Using inductive reasoning, one could then conclude that all swans are white. Yet exploration to the East revealed black swans in Australia. Induction, then, can never yield certainty since only one falsifiable observation is needed to refute the (inductively based) theory.[3]

            From this, six foundational concepts necessary for scientific pursuit can be discerned. A description of these events, followed by their role within the science of psychology will be given.

        Empirical evidence is the first component to scientific pursuit. The data collected does not rely on belief or argumentation; rather it is collected through direct observation or experimentation. Careful experimentation and documentation is necessary for data collection and future replication of the study. Next, accurate science requires objectivity. Personal feelings and values should be eliminated so as not to compromise objectivity. The data should speak for itself, even if that implies a different outcome than the investigator initially desired. Third, control of all extraneous variables is necessary to validly establish cause (IV) and effect (DV). Prediction of future occurrences of the phenomenon is the fourth component of a reliable scientific method. Hypothesis testing is the fifth component. Hypothesis testing requires that the hypothesis be made prior to the experiment, serves as a prediction, and is derived from theory. Both a Null and Alternative hypothesis must be operationally defined and unambiguous so that they can be tested and replicated. Finally, the replication process ensures accuracy and confidence in creating a scientific body of knowledge. Intense discoveries that cannot be replicated should not be accepted by other scientists.

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[1] Similarly, Vgotsky’s monumental critique of the fragmented methodologies in the field of psychology was published in 1928.

[2] While relevant to the topic of the scientific nature of psychology, a discussion of Null Hypothesis testing, Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian statistical methods, and the incorporation of stricter statistical protocols that mimic the natural sciences is beyond the scope of this present discussion. 

[3] Popper was also conscious of the reciprocal interaction between the individual and her environment. He therefore rightly rejected the naïve empiricist claims of objective observation of the natural world. Rather, Popper holds that all observation begins from a specific viewpoint and is influenced by the knowledge and experience already possessed by human beings.

by Phillip Kuna, PhD (abd) 

for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling
Drjohngkuna.com

The Misattribution of Misattribution: Analysis of the Cognitive models of Hallucinations, Part III

On a different but related front, a study by Aleman et al. (2000) sought to investigate the Perky phenomenon, or the theory that the cognitive mechanisms involved in reality testing are similar between normal control groups and psychotic, hallucinating groups. 243 undergraduates from Utrecht University were screened for a propensity toward hallucinations by the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS). The LSHS purports to measure an individual’s tendency towards hallucinations by posing such questions as, “I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud.” 19 high scoring participants and 17 low scoring participants were selected. Male to female ratios between groups were comparable, and the mean difference between groups was significant: t = 23.7, p < .0001.

The two selected groups were then administered both the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale and the Marks Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Several experimental tasks were administered to both groups. The tasks involved both visual and auditory imagery perception comparison tasks, as well as a musical imagery task (to assess auditory modalities) and a letter imagery task (to assess visual modalities).  While the precise methodology of these visual and auditory tasks varied throughout the experiment, the nature of the experiment required participants to create a mental image in order to make accurate decisions. In the perceptual condition, for example, pictures of the following objects would be presented to the participants: “pumpkin”, “lettuce” and “tomato”. In contrast, in the imagery condition, only the names of the objects were presented—thus, creating the need for the formation of mental images.

With two questionnaires and three experimental tasks (each with two subdivisions of an auditory and visual modality), replication of descriptive statistics here would likely bog down the reader and serve only to distract from the overall argument of this paper. Still, the results of Aleman’s copious work were positive: the researchers replicated earlier results showing that hallucination prone individuals report more vivid mental imagery. The two groups, however, did not differ at all on five of the six experimental imagery tasks. For this reason, Aleman et al. concluded that the—as yet unknown—cognitive processes implicated in reality testing, rather than heightened mental imagery, play a decisive role in hallucinatory events.

Aleman et al.’s introduction ironically provides highlights of the inconsistencies of the current literature regarding the more vivid mental imagery hypothesis in hallucinating individuals. Providing a brief synopsis of the literature, the researchers note how Slade (1976) and Mintz and Alpert (1972) found that hallucinating individuals experienced more vivid mental imagery compared to their non-hallucinating counterparts. Brett and Starker (1977) and Starker and Jolin (1982), on the other hand, unable to replicate the above findings, could not discern evidence of more increased vivid mental imagery in hallucinating vs. non-hallucinating patients. Aleman et al. argue that the latter two studies failed to replicate previous findings because both studies were concerned with “introspective measures of imagery, which are limited to the subjective experience of imagery.”

The underlying assumption in Aleman et al.’s critique highlights the present argument uncannily. With a lacuna of a systematic epistemological presentation and his association of internal events with subjectivity, Aleman et al.’s position smacks suspiciously of positivism. That is, Aleman et al. seem to imply that what is “out there” is objective and real, and what is inside is subjective and faulty.

Space does not permit a complete analysis and defense of the way in which internal data, of themselves, are not necessarily subjective or less real than external data. The curious reader is refered to Bernard Lonergan’s seminal work, Insight. Regardless, the original argument of this paper—that the success of future cognitional research regarding hallucinations derives by securing it in a common epistemological framework—is clearly shown. Aleman’s approach, and subsequent critique, differs from Starker and Jolin’s (1982), who in turn differ from Mintz and Alpert (1972), who in turn, no doubt, will differ from future researchers. The lack of unity comes not from their respective choice of instruments, or from their sample size, or even the statistical tests chosen, but rather from their fundamental differences of epistemological and cognitional theories.

A further explanation for the possible cognitive mechanism underlying hallucinations is the liberal response bias, which claims that hallucinatory patients will more likely report imaginary events as real. That is, the tendency to make false (and often early) detection in cases of doubt or uncertainty of the presented stimuli has been found to be correlated with hallucinating individuals. As is common, this phenomenon has been replicated in numerous studies throughout the literature. A 2005 study, again by Brébion et al., sought to extend this theory using new measures. As with Aleman et al. above, Brébion et al. similarly introduce their research by indicating the conflicting results between their research and the literature. Specifically, Brébion et al. note how Ragaland et al. (2003) reported findings that indicate a liberal response bias is associated with delusions, not hallucinations. Heinrichs and McDermid-Vaz (2004), however, were unable to detect any relationship between false word recognition and global positive symptoms scores in individuals with schizophrenia. Brébion et al. naturally conclude that Heinrichs and McDermid-Vaz (2004) misinterpreted the data, and undertake the current studies to confirm their hypothesis.

In order to test the liberal response bias hypothesis, Brébion et al. administered a word recognition test to 40 in and out patient individuals with schizophrenia. After being assessed for both positive and negative symptoms, participants were shown 16 concrete, simple words. Each list contained 8 high frequency words and 8 low frequency words. Participants were instructed that they had 45 seconds to memorize the list, and were required to read the list aloud. After a five minute pause the participants were given a blank sheet and asked to transcribe as many words as possible from memory. They were then provided a recognition sheet containing the 16 actually seen words as well as 16 distractor words, and asked to circle the words from the original list. A second word list was provided with similar instructions. In this second session, however, participants were provided the recognition sheet (with accompanying distractor words) immediately following the presentation of the original word list.

As predicted, Brébion et al. found a significant correlation between hallucination scores and response bias, and the researchers interpreted this to imply that higher levels of hallucinations are related to the propensity to make more false recognition of words not actually presented in the list. The researchers found further that anhedonia had a significant relationship with a reduction in response bias—indicating the opposite effect for that of hallucinations. During data analysis, participant scores on the National Adult Reading Test (NART) were factored, in an attempt to control for the effects of memory and verbal intelligence.

Two distinct limitations are apparent in this work. First, as in the Aleman et al. critique, requiring participant vocalization of the word unnecessarily inserts an external component to the measurement of an internal event. Second, Brébion et al. interprets the results to indicate that the liberal response bias exhibited directly implicate an external source. The problem with this assumption is that it is simply not supported by the literature. Although several studies on hallucinations indicate that patients attribute their hallucinations occurring “from outside” (ie, externalizing), there are equally ample cases where

hallucinations are reported to be from “inside” (Copoloy, Trauer and Mackinnon, 2004; Junginger and Frame, 1985). That is, Brébion et al. seem to assume that hallucinations must have an externalizing component to be a hallucination. Finally, as the literature itself shows inconsistencies, perhaps the fundamental issue at hand is the use of a paradigm that could embrace the constructs relevant to this research—concepts such as self vs. other, subjective vs. objective reality, and internal vs. external events.

by Phillip J Kuna, PhD (abd)
for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates Counseling

www.drjohngkuna.com