Bridging
the gap: Lonergan’s Theory of Conscious Intentionalitycontributions. By his own admission, his academic career was carried out "under impossible conditions," within a system that was "hopelessly antiquated" (Lonergan, 1973, p. 15). It was a system that, in neglecting the need for specialization in modernity, relied too heavily on the outdated concept of the homo universale while simultaneously operating within both an insufficient philosophy and a classicist notion of culture (Lonergan, 1974, pp. 209-210)
The
archaic and perennial philosophy to which Lonergan revolted was the
metaphysical system developed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who in turn relied heavily
on Aristotle. It was a metaphysical system based on the archaic notion of a
faculty psychology. Faculty psychology suggests that the mind consists of
different powers, or faculties: the intellect, the will, and the emotions—all the
while presupposing a Cartesian mind-body dualism. Indeed, faculty psychology’s
grip was so strong that it remained the prevailing learning theory until the early 20th century when Edward Thorndike, the
student of William James, published groundbreaking studies on learning in
animals and humans (Thorndike,
1932). Clearly, such
a faculty psychology would not be sufficient to address the emerging concerns
of the 20th century.
Lonergan’s
project, then, was an attempt to take into account the Enlightenment’s turn to
the subject while at the same time constructing a methodology that would avoid
the Kantian epidemic of collapsing in on itself. Thus, Lonergan asserts that
while metaphysics may still be first in itself, it is no longer the foundation
that it once was. Rather, he takes cognitional operations and intentionality analysis,
as his starting point (intentionality analysis refers here to the philosophy of
Lonergan’s Transcendental Method, of which his cognitional theory forms the
basis). It has as its basis the
following pre-suppositions: 1) humans have an unrestricted, unlimited, detached
and disinterested desire to know (as is evidenced in the constant questioning,
that any parent of a toddler is familiar with), 2) a normative and fixed
pattern of recurring mental and cognitional operations involved in the process
of inquiry and investigation, and 3) immanent norms of intelligence, reasonableness
and responsibility that guide the cognitive dimension of human consciousness (Lonergan,
1992).
What
Lonergan provides then, is a cognitional theory that informs a theory of
consciousness, which in turn informs a metaphysics and an ethics. The
decisiveness of Lonergan’s theory can be seen in sharp distinction to the many
conflicting and often overwhelming theories of consciousness currently in
vogue. Even a brief survey of the psychological literature on consciousness
studies reveals multifaceted methodologies often based on inaccurate or
incomplete foundations. Searle (1997), for instance, appeals to perceptual
models to describe the imperceptibleness of consciousness. Others (Dennett,
1991; Griffin, 1991; Hay, 2007) maintain that mental images and representations
are necessary to explain the invisibleness of consciousness. Finally, still
others (Chalmers, 1996) argue that while attempts to explain the invisible are
all well and good, but what is physical is ultimately real. The irony of course
is that even those in the hard sciences—say, particle physics for
instance—understand that the particles they are discussing are often times
simply constructs of human intelligence. Such constructs, while not ultimately
tangible, are ways to explain what must indeed be so if they are to offer an
explanation of what has actually been observed. In other words, the future of
the science of psychology may be contingent upon the integration of both the
objective and subjective components inherent in human cognition.
While
Lonergan’s method has received great attention in the fields of philosophy,
theology, ethics (Melchin, 1987), feminist studies (Crysdale, 1994) and even
economics (McShane, 1996), there is a notable lack of application of his method
in the field of psychology. Proceeding now to summarize Lonergan’s account of
the unfolding of human consciousness, the explication and defense of each
unique and distinct philosophical position will be clearly untenable. I refer the
curious to his original works.
Non-reflexive
Consciousness
Lonergan
distinguishes between what he terms reflexive consciousness and non-reflexive consciousness. Generally,
consciousness is defined here as an “interior experience, of oneself and one’s
acts, where experience is taken in the strict sense of the word” (Lonergan,
2002, p. 157). It is the strict sense insofar as it differs from an undefined
knowledge. It is experiential insofar as it is a direct awareness of data,
which initiates a process of intellectual inquiry to understand what has been
experienced and to pronounce judgment on its reality.
Non-Reflexive consciousness, then,
is conscious awareness of awareness. Such a cognitional act does not imply an
object. Rather, it is an experiential awareness of one’s own subjectivity. Again,
such awareness is not found by naval-gazing introspection. Introspection would
only reveal the subject as object. To discern the subject as subject one has
merely to increase one’s level of activity. “If one sleeps and dreams, one
becomes present to oneself as the frightened dreamer. If one wakes, one becomes
present to oneself, not as moved but as moving.” (Lonergan, 1967, p. 227)
Inasmuch as it is an experience of
one’s acts, Lonergan argues that while one performs their daily tasks of living
they are aware, not only of the sensations and data of experience, but also
aware of the acts themselves. For example, right now as I hear my dog bark, I
can recognize not only the sounds, but I am also able to attend to the fact
that I am hearing. Again, I can decide that my dog needs to be taken outside.
In this instance, I am aware not only of the decision to take him out, but also
of my own cognitional state of deciding and finally of myself as deciding
(Lonergan, 1967, pp. 175-176).
A
further clarification rests on Lonergan’s distinction between consciousness and
reflexive knowledge. Consciousness is not to be confused with reflexive
knowledge. Consciousness, in Lonergan’s terms, comes prior to reflexive
self-knowledge, and as such, is the subject’s experience of oneself as subject.
Reflexive self-knowledge, on the other hand, completes the direct awareness of
consciousness by forming and verifying concepts through the subject’s
self-experience (Lonergan, 1967, pp. 177-178).
A
comparative analysis should yield further clarification. Lonergan demarcates
his own line of thought from the many prevailing opinions that consider
consciousness to be some sort of introspection, or positions that describes or
implies that conscious awareness involves some sort of inward looking.[1]
Termed Conscientia-perceptio[2] by
Lonergan, this view supposes that consciousness is the same process as direct
knowing. Yet such analogies fail here, for in non-reflexive consciousness, there
is no subject-object relationship governing the cognitive processes. Rather, it
is simply objectless awareness, with no objectified aspect of self. That is to
say, my knowledge of my dog is not equivalent to the way in which I am aware of
myself. In both cases there is knowledge of an object. Notable is that in the
second case that subject knows oneself as an object. The problem with conscientia-perceptio, Lonergan argues,
is that a cognitive act does not constitute any effect in its object. That is,
if consciousness is direct self-knowledge, then it would have no constitutive
effect on the self, thereby reducing the subject’s psychological unity to
beyond the object in one’s range of knowledge. This distinction between non-reflexive
and reflexive consciousness is crucial for Lonergan, for it is “the difference
between conscious and unconscious acts” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 322). That is, it
is from the subjective and conscious awareness (non-reflecting consciousness)
from which the objectification of cognitional acts of reflecting consciousness
emerge. The following section describes Lonergan’s account of reflexive consciousness—the
intentional acts of human consciousness that enable us to grasp the inherent
intelligibility of both internal and external stimuli.
Reflexive
Consciousness and Intentionality Analysis
For
Lonergan, the objectification of subjective stimuli, both external and
internal, occurs as one’s reflexive consciousness unfolds through four distinct
levels. Levels here should be understood metaphorically. Spatial and temporal
analogies of human conscious tend to fail since they imply an ocular component
to consciousness. Further, unlike the direct awareness of self-provided by
non-reflexive consciousness, reflexive consciousness always intends an object
(Lonergan, 1967).
The
acts of reflexive consciousness that intends both internal and external
objects, Lonergan argues, are governed by four distinct levels of
intentionality. The four levels of intentionality—conscious awareness (attention),
intelligent understanding (intelligence), reasonable judgment (reasonableness),
and responsible decision (responsibility)—are proposed to be the normative and
recurrent pattern of human cognition. That is, in conjunction with the ongoing
and non-objectified self-awareness of non-reflexive consciousness, cognitive
operations experienced in the form of questioning, provide an orientation
toward objectification of an attended to stimuli—again, whether external or
internal.
The
first level of conscious intentionality, attending to the stimulus at hand,
implies more than mere looking. In Lonergan’s system, conscious awareness and
attention imply the “detached, disinterested desire to know” (Lonergan, 1992,
p. 10). It implies a thrust of wonder, of curiosity, of marvel. Such is the
wonder Aristotle spoke of, citing it as the beginning of all philosophy and
scientific knowledge. Such is the wonder of the young child, who with innocent and
unwavering curiosity interrogates his parents with questions ad infinitum.[3]
Lonergan
describes the second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent
understanding, in this way: “an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to
understand, express what we have understood, and work out the presuppositions
and implications of our position” (Lonergan, 1992, p. 9). The understanding and
insights produced by intelligently probing the data received through conscious
awareness opens up then further questions that can only be answered by
advancement to the third level of reasonable judgment.
Reasonable
judgment answers to the question, “Is it so? Is it not so? Is it?” In
Lonerganian terms: the insights, hypotheses, and theories propounded in the
second level of conscious intentionality, intelligent understanding, are put to
the strict demands of rational judgment. As Lonergan (1992) explains, the third
level contains
The effective
operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason is
where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for
the unconditioned and the refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground.
It advances to a grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational
compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent (p. 346).
Here, the unconditioned simply
means that all pertinent questions have been answered. If a person comes home
after a long day at work, see smoke in the air and water on the floor, can he
assume there was a fire? Have all pertinent questions been answered? According
to Lonergan, he has not yet answered all pertinent questions, and therefore
cannot be said to have grasped the virtually unconditioned. All one say in the
above scenario is that there is smoke in the air and water on the floor, and
something has happened.
Finally,
Lonergan’s fourth level of conscious intentionality, responsible decision,
entails the raising and answering of questions that imply a reasonable and
responsible course of action. Similar to personal agency, such an concept of
responsible decision implies that human beings can freely choose a course of
action that is either consistent or inconsistent to what has been determined to
be reasonable understanding (second level) of the attended (first level) to
data (Lonergan, 1972).
Attempts
to deny Lonergan’s cognitional structure and theory of conscious intentionality
would imply that the commentator has not attended to the data, is
unintelligent, unreasonable, or sound asleep. That is, any attempts to refute
Lonergan’s claims would necessarily involve the operations outlined above,
namely—attending to the data presented, grasping the intelligibility of the
theory, and making a reasonable judgment of its veracity (Lonergan, 1972, p.
17).
Up to this point, we have outlined
in broad strokes the basis for Lonergan’s methodology.
Thus far, we have
looked to the success of the natural sciences to gather a preliminary
understanding of methodology. We have taken a detour behind the techniques of
the natural sciences to the fundamentals of the cognitional operations of the
human mind. From those basic processes of the human mind, a transcendental
method[4]
can be discerned—basic patterns and operations that are employed, cross
culturally, in every cognitional enterprise. From there, the formulation of
such a transcendental method can be accurately applied to special methodologies
appropriate for particular fields of study (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). As Lonergan
(1972) notes,
However true it is
that one attends, understands, judges, decides differently in the natural
sciences, in the human sciences, as in theology, still the difference in no way
imply or suggest a transition from attention to inattention, from intelligence
to stupidity, from reasonableness to silliness, from responsibility to
irresponsibility (p. 23).
Part IV of this
post will conclude by outlining an application of Lonergan’s method to the
science of psychology.
By Phillip Kuna
For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and
Associates Counseling
[1] A select few of
psychology’s prevailing theories of consciousness that employ such perceptual
models were covered earlier, if but briefly.
[2] Lonergan, 2002, p. 181.
The phrase can be loosely translated from the Latin as “perceptive
consciousness”.
[3] For more on this
orientation of wonder, and its subsequent decline with age, see Lonergan
(2012), chapters 6 and 7.
[4] The method is
transcendental because it goes beyond (transcends) itself by the raising of
further questions.
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