The Central Nervous System: Correlates of Dreams and Waking Hallucinations

In a previous entry, I explored the connection between the visual system and visual hallucinations reported by individuals with schizophrenia. Since dreams can be understood as the nervous system’s processing of endogenous information, I was interested to understand and explore the correlation between dreams and hallucinations as they are processed by the nervous system.

            Research revealed a fruitful article by Mahowald, Woods, and Schenck titled, “Sleeping Dreams, Waking Hallucinations, and the Central Nervous System.” The authors note that the study concerns the critical evaluation of “the similarities and differences between dreams and hallucinations, with particular reference to the role of the central nervous system in each and with consideration of their patho-physiologic implications.” More of a review of the literature  than an empirical study, the article had 6 major headings: 1) dream mechanisms, 2) hallucination mechanisms, 3) dreaming and hallucinations: state disassociation models, 4) hallucinations (spontaneous and induced) in the non-psychiatric population, 5) dreams and hallucinations as a manifestation of consciousness, 6) hallucinations in neurological disorders.  For the astute reader, a copious and valuable four pages of references follows the article.

            The first section was standard enough. Their presentation of hallucinatory mechanisms stressed a view of endogenous brain activity being released when the individual is dissociated from stimuli: for instance, West’s theory argues that we are always in a dream state; we just are not attending to it because we are constantly stimulated—we can’t see the stars during the day, though they are still there.

            Section 4, while interesting, wasn’t my main interest in the article, as it presented topics such: fasting and sleep deprivation induced hallucinations (especially in religious/mystics), and drug induced hallucinations. Skipping ahead, the final section (6) provided more substance to several related areas, including: hallucinations in Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, phantom limb syndrome, and Charles Bonnet Syndrome.

            Finally, the fifth section (dreams and hallucinations as a manifestation of consciousness) had interesting correlates to schizophrenic hallucinations. We know that the brain is active during both REM and non REM sleep. Further, we can define consciousness as the brains awareness of all available data presented to it. While awake, this information is our environment, external stimuli. While asleep, however, this stimulus is internally generated. Further, we know from neuroimaging that during REM sleep there is a decrease in PVC (primary visual cortex) and Frontal Association activity. From this information, the researchers hypothesize that “the extrastriate cortices and paralimbic areas may be operating as a closed system, functionally disconnected from the primary visual and the frontal regions responsible for the integration of visual information.”

            Further evidence for this hypothesis that consciousness is maintained by the brain’s spatial and temporal mapping that integrates multiple brain areas can be seen in the fact that both during REM and the wake state there is a 40 Hz oscillatory rhythm throughout the cortex. Such a rhythmic oscillation may provide a continuous “neuronal humming” whereby internal or external irregularities would be conspicuous. What is most interesting is that this rhythm is reset during the wake state by sensory stimuli…but it is not reset during REM sleep.

            The theory, then, is that some deviation of either the spatial or temporal regularity of this rhythm may be at the root of some hallucinations—specifically those experienced by individuals with schizophrenia. Much of the literature uncovered, however, focused squarely on the differences between dreams and hallucinations. The convergence of these themes proved fertile, and we can most certainly anticipate further research involving this intersection. More so as our neurobiological techniques and understanding increases. For instance, it was only 40 years ago that the REM phasic event intrusion hypothesis was offered as an explanation for waking hallucinations in schizophrenia, but this theory was never verified because the prevailing assumption at the time was that dreaming was confined to REM sleep only!

References

Mahowald, M. W., Woods, S. R., & Schenck, C. H. (1998). Sleeping dreams, waking

hallucinations, and the central nervous system. Dreaming, 8(2), 89-102.

doi:10.1023/B:DREM.0000005899.59224.17

by +Phillip J. Kuna

for John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates

drjohngkuna.com

Is Psychology a Science? (Part IV, Conclusion)

Bernard Lonergan

Method, then, is defined as “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 4). Here, cumulative results entail a sustained succession of discoveries and progress results indicate synthesis of each new insight that builds upon previously validated insights. Yet transcendental method is more than a mere prescription, a set of rules to follow. Increasing a set of regulations associated with a methodology does not necessarily increase cumulative and progressive results. What is needed, Lonergan argues, is a “prior, normative pattern of operations from which rules may be derived” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 6). Lonergan’s cognitional structure and intentionality analysis provide such an a priori structure with which to inform a methodology.

            The implications for such a methodology are nothing short of staggering. If correct, Lonergan’s transcendental method provides the basis for integrating first person data with third person data into a unified theory. As Lonergan explains,

Transcendental method offers a key to unified science…in harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind, which operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each (Lonergan, 1972, p. 24).   

The process of heightening one’s conscious intentionality, directing one’s awareness to one’s own conscious and cognitional operations is what Lonergan terms self-appropriation. Indeed, the first four chapters of Lonergan’s Insight are nothing short of exercises in self-appropriation. Guiding the reader though a series of thought experiments, the beginning of Insight is meant to allow the reader to reach that eureka moment, and to form an awareness of what happens within themselves during such cognitional procedures. Such self-appropriation is the basis for transcendental method, and is indeed the only way in which to assure accurate first person data as well as a secure methodological foundation:

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human…subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodological control…as well as an a priori whence he can understand other men [women], their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

            Further, self-appropriation necessarily implies the employment of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts that correspond to the above cognitional operations: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. Providing an experiential, first person data for these cognitional structures not only enables the duplication and reiteration of these structures, but again, also provides an invariant and structured methodology:

Despite the doubts and denials of positivists and behaviorists, no one, unless some of his [or her] organs are deficient is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing…of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all of his lifelong he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his own activities (Lonergan, 1972, p. 16-17).

            Finally, Lonergan’s method is trans-cultural. He argues that the rational self-consciousness that can be derived from intentionality analysis is not only normative but also innate to each individual regardless of their cultural milieu. That is, these cognitional features are present in each person, and are the stabilizing feature throughout even, say, a differentiation from a classicist perspective to an empirical one (Lonergan, 1967). The classicist views culture as perennial, absolute, whereas the empiricist is able to adapt to the changing tide of human living, while nonetheless retaining truth (Lonergan, 1972, p. 333). Such a cross cultural methodology would surely be of great interest to many psychologists.

Implications

            One may contend that all this philosophy is well and good, but how would one proceed to utilize transcendental method in concrete or therapeutic situations. Brannick (2006) offers a unique voice to the contribution. His unpublished Master’s thesis wove together strands of Lonergan’s thought with emergent probability theory. He concluded by presenting the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) as a possible psychometric instrument with which to empirically validate Lonergan’s claim to unification of the objective and subjective dimensions of human conscious operations. Theoretically, Brannick’s argument is sound. Yet, as he notes in his conclusion, the restructuring of the RIM needed to adapt it to Lonergan’s scheme has yet to be undertaken. I heartily second Brannick’s recommendation for further work on this front.

            Further applications of transcendental method are nearly limitless. For instance, one could see how social psychologists would be particularly interested in such a methodology. Answers to questions as how does one conduct a social survey on current topics such as race relations, abortion, or the legal status of gay marriage without being influenced by one’s personal values are neatly answered in Lonergan’s system. Clearly, value-free systems are illusory—either by those conducting the survey or by those surveyed. And while the study of values may properly belong to ethicists, one cannot realistically divorce value-laden systems from human behavior. In that vein, a more appropriate, more Lonerganian approach would be an explicit recognition and divulgence of one’s values. Such values would indicate one’s approach to the survey, and would also dictate why certain questions are raised and not others. Through self-appropriation, values become explicit, enabling a secure and unambiguous foundation for experimentation.

Conclusion

            Having situated the topic within the framework of both the historical and emerging paradigms of psychology, we preceded to provide an over-view of the general nature of scientific inquiry. Such an explication was necessary, not only to again situate the discussion of psychology within the other sciences, but more importantly to provide a heuristic basis to the way in which I argued that psychology should view and subsequently proceed as a scientific discipline. The subsequent discussion on the nature and extent of objective-subjective divide within psychology provided concrete instances, which I later implied how Lonergan’s transcendental method would be applicable to such instances. Finally, Lonergan’s transcendental method based both from his cognitional theory and his theory of conscious intentionality was presented as a viable alternative to the pluralistic epistemological accounts now operating in mainstream psychology.

            Alarcon (1997) has argued that a unifying paradigm for psychology should be based on 1) philosophical anthropology, 2) the domains within which psychology ought to operate and 3) methodological avenues.  Indeed, by grounding objectivity within one’s own subjectivity and rational self-consciousness, Lonergan’s method provides a plausible, reliable and indeed first person empirical alternative to the varied methodological approaches to the study of psychology. As Meynell (1994) has noted,

According to one extreme view of the matter, a true science of humanity would reduce the explanation of human behavior to natural scientific laws. At the other extreme, it is protested that one needs for the human sciences a kind of ‘divinization’, ‘empathy’ or whatever, which is wholly distinct from any procedure to be employed by the natural scientist. Lonergan’s position on the matter at once mediates between these two extremes, and is perfectly consistent within itself. What is particular to the human sciences, in his view, is that the object as well as the subject of inquiry is to be assumed to be more or less intelligent, reasonable and so on, and its behavior to be explained accordingly…in the natural as in the human sciences, one has intelligently and creatively to hypothesize; but in the human as in the natural sciences, one has reasonably to judge one’s hypotheses to be probably true or false according to their corroboration or falsification by relevant observable data (p. 121-122).

            I offer one final anecdote in conclusion. Max Planck, the scientist responsible for the revolutionary and fundamental discoveries regarding quantum theory, put forth this question in his autobiography: how is it that a new scientific paradigm becomes accepted within the larger community? Is it the lucidity of the observations? Perhaps it is the exactness of measurements? Or yet still, it may be decisiveness of the experimental results? No, in fact none of these are the cause. The real reason for the advancement of a new scientific revolution, Plank says, is when the present generation of professors is retired (Planck, 1949, p. 33-34). In other words, in the context of paradigmatic shifts, both the social and the hard sciences share the common ground of a rethinking of the basic axioms and postulates inherent to their study—a transformation of the object of their study. In the social sciences, however, and particularly within psychology, the human person is the object of study. What I urge is needed, then, is nothing short of the radical transformation of the human person—who is at once both the subject and object of scientific investigation. Lonergan’s self-appropriation of interiority provides an empirically, self-verified methodology that bridges the subjective—objective dichotomy.  As Lonergan puts it, “authentic objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.” (Lonergan, 1972, p. 292).

By Phillip J. Kuna

For John G. Kuna, Psy.D. and Associates

Drjohngkuna.com

References

Alarcón R. (1997). La síntesis experimental del comportamiento y la unificación de la                            psicología. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 29 (3), 415-433

Beveridge, A. Time to abandon the subjective—objective divide? The Psychiatrist (2002)

26: 101-103 doi: 10.1192/pb.26.3.101

Bühler, K. (1927). Die Krise der Psychologie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.

Brannick, K. J. (2006). Norms of the Mind: Applying Lonergan’s Analysis of Human    consciousness to the epistemological crisis in psychological theory and clinical

practice (Master’s thesis). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses

database (Accession No.: 2006-99002-250).

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory.

New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p< .05). American Psychologist, 49(12), 997-1003.             Doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.12.997

Crysdale, C. ed. (1994). Lonergan and Feminism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

De Feijoo. (2011). La crisis de la subjetividad: Despuntar de las psicologías

fenomenológicas. Psicologia em Estudo, 16(3), 409-417.

Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & Co.

Driver-Linn, E. ( 2003). Where is psychology going? Structural fault lines revealed by                          psychologists' use of Kuhn. American Psychologist, 58, 269– 278.

Doran, R. (1977). Subject and psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the search for foundations.                          Washington, DC: University Press of America.

Gardner, H. ( 2005). Scientific psychology: Should we bury it or praise it? In R. J.Sternberg                (Ed.) , Unity in psychology: Possibility or pipedream? (pp. 77– 90).

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Goertzen, J. R. (2008). On the possibility of unification: The reality and nature of

the crisis in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 18(6), 829-852. doi:10.1177/0959354308097260

Griffin, D. R. (1991). What is consciousness and why is it so problematic? In K. R. Kao

(Ed.), Cultivating consciousness: Enhancing human potential, wellness, and healing (pp. 51–70). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Grünbaum, A. (1979). Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory pseudo-scientific by Karl

Popper's criterion of demarcation? Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25(4), 574-589. doi:10.1037/a0013540

Grünbaum, A. (2012). Epistemological liabilities of the psychoanalytic method of free                            association, In M. Holowchak (Ed.), Radical claims in Freudian psychoanalysis:                        Point/Counterpoint (pp. 167-172). Lanham, MD US: Jason Aronson.

Hay, D. (2007). Something there: The biology of the human spirit. Philadelphia, PA:

 Templeton Foundation Press.

Helminiak, D. A. (2013). More Than Awareness: Bernard Lonergan's Multi-Faceted

Account of Consciousness. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.

Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0031682

Heisenberg, W. (1958). The Physicist's Conception of Nature. London: Hutchinson.

Horstein, Gale. The Return of the Repressed. Psychology’s Problematic Relations with                       Psychoanalysis 1909-1960.
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague: 
            Martinus Nihjoff Publishers.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Evolution and revolution in the philosophy of science. Revista

            Mexicana de Análisis de la Conducta, 3(1), 7-16.

Kantor, J. R. (1979). Psychology: Science or nonscience? The Psychological Record,

29(2), 155-163.

Kline, P. (1989). Objective tests of Freud's theories. In A. M. Colman, J. Beaumont

(Eds.), Psychology survey, 7 (pp. 127-145). Oxford Florence, England: British Psychological Society.

Koch, S. (1971). Reflections on the state of psychology. Social Research, 38, 669–709.

Koch, S. (1981). The nature and limits of psychological knowledge: Lessons of a century

qua“science.” American Psychologist, 36, 257–269.

Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of

Chicago Press.

Lacey, H. (1999). Is science value free? Values and scientific understanding. London,

UK: Routledge.

Lonergan, B. J. F. (1967). “Cognitional Structure” in F. E. Crowe (Ed.). Collection:

Papers by Bernard Lonergan (221-239). New York, NY: Herder and Herder.

Lonergan, B. J. F. (1972). Method in theology. New York, NY: Herder and Herder.

Lonergan. B. J. F. (1973). Philosophy of God and Theology: The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the functional Specialty, Systematics. London: Darton

Longman and Todd.

Lonergan, B. J. F. (1974). “An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, SJ.” In A Second   Collection. Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press.

Lonergan, B. J. F. (1992). Insight: A study of human understanding. Collected works of

Bernard Lonergan (Vol. 3). Toronto, Canada: Toronto University Press. (Original

work published 1957)

Lonergan, B. J. F. (2002). The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Vol. 7). (Michael Shields, Trans).

Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Original work published in 1956)

McShane, P. (1996). Economics for Everyone. Edmonton: Commonwealth Press.

Melchin, K. (1987). History, Ethics and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and

History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America.

Meynell, H. (1994). Lonergan's Cognitional Theory and Method in Psychology. Theory                         Psychology, 4: 105 DOI: 10.1177/0959354394041005

Planck, M. (1949). Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. F. Gaynor. New

York: Philosophical Library.

Polkinghorne, D. (1982). What makes research humanistic? Journal of Humanistic

Psychology, 22(3), 47-54. doi: 10.1177/0022167882223007

Popper, K. (1935). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York, NY: Science Editions,

Inc.

Rogers, C. (1961). On Becoming a Person. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Rogers, C. (1965). Client Centered Therapy. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Rychlak, J. F. ( 2005). Unification in theory and method: Possibilities and

impossibilities. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Unity in psychology: Possibility or pipedream? (pp. 145– 158). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Searle, J. R. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York, NY: The New York Review

of Books.

Staats, A.W. (1983). Psychology’s crisis of disunity: Philosophy and method for a unified                      science. New York: Praeger Publishers.

 Staats, A. W. (1999). Unifying psychology requires new infrastructure, theory, method,

and a research agenda. Review of General Psychology, 3(1), 3-13. 10.1037/1089-2680.3.1.3

Staats, A. W. (1998). Unifying psychology: A scientific or non-scientific theory task?

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 18(1), 70-79. 10.1037/h0091317

Stam, H. J. (2004). Unifying Psychology: Epistemological Act or Disciplinary

Maneuver? Journal Of Clinical Psychology, 60(12), 1259-1262. doi:10.1002/jclp.20069

Tharp, R. G. (2007). A perspective on unifying culture and psychology: Some

philosophical and scientific issues. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 27-28(2-1), 213-233. doi: 10.1037/h0091294

Thorndike, E. (1932), The Fundamentals of Learning. New York, NY: Bureau of

Publications, Teacher’s College, Columbia University.

Yanchar, S.C. (1997). Fragmentation in focus: History, integration, and the project of

evaluation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 17, 150-171.

Zavershneva, E. (2012). Investigating L.S. Vygotsky’s Manuscript “The Historical

Meaning of  the Crisis in Psychology.” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 50(4), 42-63. doi: 10.2753/RPO1061-0405500402

The Empathy-Altruism Debate: An Empirical Approach

The Empathy-Altruism Debate: An Empirical Approach

           

Taking a break from the biological perspective of our previous two blogs, this entry looks at a universally occurring social psychological phenomenon—namely, the possibility of  to committing a purely self-less act? Is the person who returns a large sum of found money doing it out of selflessness, to alleviate guilt, fear of being caught, or some other variable? What about the interpersonal acts of supposed altruism? Providing a monetary donation to a mendicant because they need help and you are altruistic, or because it may impress the date on your arm?

C. Daniel Batson is arguably the authority on pro-social behavior and motivational factors, specifically the topic at hand: the altruism-empathy debate. The altruism-empathy debate describes the phenomenon whereby individuals help another due to feelings of empathy for them, regardless of the gain/cost analysis. In this model, empathy is the motivational factor and not simply the need to alleviate a negative state of guilt, shame, etc.

Summary

            In this early (1981) study, Batson et al. performed two experiments in order to test their hypothesis—contrary to the consensus of the past few decades of literature—that empathy does indeed stem from altruistic and not egoistic motivation. The researchers note from the outset the inherent difficulties with this task. Since altruism and egotism are motivational factors that can’t be directly observed, the experiment must be constructed and participants manipulated in such a way that the behavior can be measured. After a brief hiatus, providing the reader with operational definitions, Batson gets to the guts of the experiment.

            The experiment contained a rigged lottery held to determine that the confederate (Elaine) be required to work a 10-trial task where participants are told she would receive random electrical shocks. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to gauge task performance under adverse conditions. Participants monitored Elaine’s progress on CCTV, and also had access to a galvanic skin response (GSR) monitor. During the course of the experiment, the assistant inquired about Elaine’s well-being. At this time Elaine disclosed that she had previously fallen on an electrical fence, that this experience was traumatic at the time and somewhat troubling now considering the nature of the experiment. Elaine insisted she would continue. The assistant would then ask the observer/participant if they would be willing to take Elaine’s place, so as to alleviate her suffering from the electrical shocks. The researchers found that almost all participants willingly traded places with Elaine when they knew (via questionnaires) that Elaine’s interests were similar to their own. Batson et al. presumed that empathy was elicited due to their commonly shared values and interests. Conversely, the participants that declined to aid Elaine, and instead left the situation after knowing that they did not share common values with her. Again, the researches presumed the low levels of empathy are attributable to their lack of commonality. 

Analysis               

                Most of the concerns I had while reading the article were addressed in the final, general discussion section: the fact that all the participants in both studies were all female, who were watching a same-sex confederate.  Prior research has already shown females score higher on empathy than males. Further, only two experiments were conducted. Again, the researchers note the necessity of further research. My only other caveat would be the necessity to explore other motivational factors besides simply altruism vs. egotism. What about morality? Religious beliefs? Social responsibility? Negative state relief? Race? Other under-lying biases?

Conclusion and further questions

                The notion of a pure sense altruism has been a philosopher’s playground for centuries. In fact, Batson himself notes the antiquity of the question in a later article (Batson, 1991). My already alluded to question for further research regards the possible plurality of motivational factors. I’m honestly not sure how to set up an experiment that would be simple enough to engage in, yet complex enough measure several motivational factors for altruistic behavior. In this vein, I found Van Lange’s (2008) research on the subject an interesting starting point inasmuch as he explored the activation of altruism in terms of egalitarianism (justice) and selflessness. Finally, and perhaps somewhat excitingly to those who enjoy research as much as I do, there is a vast bibliography on this topic. Batson’s references are the tip of the iceberg, but a good place to start researching the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Further suggestions for reading are listed below. Finally, whether your motivations stem from an enlightened and pure selflessness, being altruistic to others in need is always a good thing. J

References

Batson, C., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic emotion a source of altruistic motivation?. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 40(2), 290-302. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.40.2.290

Batson, C., Dyck, J. L., Brandt, J., Batson, J. G., Powell, A. L., McMaster, M., & Griffitt, C. (1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 55(1), 52-77. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.52

Batson, C., Oleson, K. C., Weeks, J. L., Healy, S. P., Reeves, P. J., Jennings, P., & Brown, T. (1989). Religious prosocial motivation: Is it altruistic or egoistic?. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 57(5), 873-884. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.5.873

Batson, C., & Shaw, L. L. (1991). Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of prosocial motives. Psychological Inquiry, 2(2), 107-122. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0202_1

Van Lange, P. M. (2008). Does empathy trigger only altruistic motivation? How about selflessness or justice?. Emotion, 8(6), 766-774. doi:10.1037/a0013967

Prepared by +Phillip Kuna

For John G. Kuna, PsyD and Associates

http://johngkunapsydandassociates.com/

https://www.facebook.com/JohnGKuna.PsyD.Associates

(570)961-3361